Johannes Loh (ISTO) und Lorenz Brachtendorf (Max-Planck-Institut für Innovation und Wettbewerb) (auf Einladung)
Max-Planck-Institut für Innovation und Wettbewerb, München, Raum E10
Peer Recommendations, Consumption Variety, and Product Performance: Evidence from a Digital Music Platform
Referent: Johannes Loh (ISTO)
Approximating the Standard Essentiality of Patents – A Semantics-Based Analysis
Referent: Lorenz Brachtendorf (Max-Planck-Institut für Innovation und Wettbewerb)
Hanna Hottenrott (TU München)
Max-Planck-Institut für Innovation und Wettbewerb, München, Raum 313
Multiple institutional affiliations occur when an academic belongs to more than one organisation. We document an increase in multiple institutional affiliations listed by authors on scientific publications based on an analysis of more than 2.5 million publications from OECD countries (plus selected countries such as China) during the 1996-2018 period. Furthermore, we find that the increase in the share of articles with multiple affiliations is more pronounced in countries that have implemented some form of Excellence Initiative (ExIn). Publication-author-level difference-in-differences analyses show that the probability of authors listing multiple affiliations after the implementation is between 1.3 (Japan) and 10 (France) percent higher than in countries without Excellence Initiatives. Evidence on roles and motivations behind these arrangements is mainly anecdotal. We argue that multiple affiliations may present a new model for competitive edge in the highly contested research market. Reporting results from an international survey on academics in three major science nations (the UK, Germany and Japan), we find that multiple affiliations are widespread across disciplines and are used to increase access to resources, networks or know-how. Junior academics also use them to increase job prospects and income, indicative of the precarious employment conditions they may find themselves in. Additional affiliations do not seem to be a source of conflict for mid-career and senior researchers, but junior researchers may face time and other work-related conflicts due to the additional commitment. The majority of additional affiliations build on personal contacts, but institutions also proactively shape the organisational links of their staff.
Ansprechpartner: Michael Rose, Ph.D.
Dr. Ingo Brinker, Dr. Ines Bodenstein (beide Gleiss Lutz-Rechtsanwälte)
Max-Planck-Institut für Innovation und Wettbewerb, Raum E10
In Kooperation mit dem Münchner Kartellrechtsforum e.V. (www.kartellrechtsforum.de)
Wie gewohnt lädt das Kartellrechtsforum e.V. anschließend zum informellen Austausch bei Getränken und Häppchen ein.
Zur besseren Planung bitten wir um Anmeldung bis zum 28.06.2019 bei Mark-E. Orth (meo(at)meo-law.de).
Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften
The program of the Munich Summer Institute 2019 is now available.
Please see here.
From 17 to 19 June 2019, the Center for Law & Economics at ETH Zurich, the Chair for Technology and Innovation Management at TUM, the Institute for Strategy, Technology and Organization at LMU Munich and the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition will jointly organize the fourth Munich Summer Institute.
The Summer Institute will focus on three areas:
The goal of the Munich Summer Institute is to stimulate a rigorous in-depth discussion of a select number of research papers and to strengthen the interdisciplinary international research community in these areas. Researchers in economics, law, management and related fields at all stages of their career (from Ph.D. students to full professors) may attend the Munich Summer Institute as presenters in a plenary or a poster session, as discussants or as attendants. The Munich Summer Institute will feature three keynote lectures, 18 plenary presentations and a daily poster session (including a poster slam). Paper presentations will be grouped by topics, not discipline or method. The Munich Summer Institute will be held at the Bavarian Academy of Sciences and Humanities in the heart of Munich. Participation is by invitation only. The organizers will fund travel and hotel expenses for all plenary speakers and hotel expenses for all poster presenters and invited discussants.
Keynote speakers are:
Further information
More information is available at the MSI website. Any questions concerning the Munich Summer Institute should be directed to Stefan Bechtold, Jörg Claussen, Dietmar Harhoff, Joachim Henkel or Tobias Kretschmer.
Lotte Anemaet (Max-Planck-Institut für Innovation und Wettbewerb) (auf Einladung)
Max-Planck-Institut für Innovation und Wettbewerb, Raum E10
Moderation: Ansgar Glatt
Martin Schmitz (Vanderbilt University)
Max-Planck-Institut für Innovation und Wettbewerb, München, Raum 313
I use newly-collected, georeferenced network panel data to study how an exogenous increase in the efficiency of exchanging knowledge affected follow-on innovation. Specifically, I examine how the introduction of inexpensive, distance-independent postage via the British Penny Postage Act of 1839 influenced the formation of links within a network of prominent British scientists. Link formation is citation-based and hence indicative of cumulative innovation. I use two-period extensions of the network formation model proposed by Graham (2017, ECMA) to identify the impact of the reform. I can distinguish between a postage reduction effect and a quality improvement effect. The model allows me to control for fixed effects for the citing and cited scientists and to take into account the existence of previous links, the efficiency of transportation, and the proximity of scientists' research areas. The model is estimated with Graham's (2017) tetrad logit estimator. (This project is work in progress.)
Ansprechpartner: Michael Rose
Sapna Kumar (Universität Houston)
Max-Planck-Institut für Innovation und Wettbewerb
In the United States, the judicial system relies upon legally specialized judges to promote uniformity and certainty. Judges who serve on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“Federal Circuit”), as well as some district court judges, develop legal expertise from hearing a high volume of patent cases.
However, although a few judges possess scientific backgrounds, technical expertise is generally lacking. This forces judges to heavily rely on party-hired experts, and may contribute to the high claim construction reversal rate. By contrast, several European patent courts utilize technically-qualified judges. These judges may lack law degrees, but work side-by-side with legally-trained judges to decide patent cases.
Sapna Kumar examines the role of technical expertise in patent litigation, and discusses limitations on courts using independent or party-hired experts. She looks at the use of technically-qualified judges in the German and Swiss federal patent court systems, as well as in the proposed Unified Patent Court, and discusses advantages and disadvantages to their use. She finally considers how greater technical expertise could be integrated into the U.S. system, such as through the use of technically-trained magistrate judges.
Michael Mireles (University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law)
Max-Planck-Institut für Innovation und Wettbewerb, Raum E10
Abstract
The development and distribution of pharmaceuticals from conception to market is a complicated and highly regulated process in the United States. The pricing of pharmaceuticals is also complicated and at times opaque. Moreover, many critique the high price of pharmaceuticals. In examining these processes and the high price of pharmaceuticals, some commentators have pointed to some solutions, including improving transparency in pricing; increasing competition in several different relevant markets, such as pharmaceutical benefit managers, distribution and manufacturing; importation of pharmaceuticals into the U.S. from foreign countries; increasing regulation on pharmaceutical benefit managers; and utilizing rate setting or other forms of price regulation. State legislators have proposed legislation capturing these solutions and some legislation has been enacted. However, the question has arisen as to whether these additional solutions only create more complexity in an incredibly complex system--could it be too much of a good thing. Framed another way, do the benefits of this mass of potential legislation outweigh the costs. Indeed, this could be exactly the way a set of solutions to high drug prices at the national level, while balancing innovation and access concerns, is developed because of public choice issues at the federal level. Unfortunately, public choice issues likely exist at the state level as well. This presentation reviews data and analyses by the National Academy of State Health Policy and raises some of the potential benefits and costs of creating 50 different laws concerning issues such as transparency, rate setting, pharmaceutical benefit managers and importation.
Speaker Bio
Professor Michael Mireles has taught over 10 different courses and currently teaches intellectual property law, Property and Wills &Trusts at the University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law in Sacramento, California. He has published papers in numerous journals including, Cardozo Law Review, University of Maine Law Review, University of Missouri-Kansas City Law Review, Southern Methodist University Law Review, University of Denver Law Review, University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, University of Utah Law Review, Indiana Law Review, Texas Intellectual Property Law Journal and University of Minnesota Journal of Law, Science and Technology. Professor Mireles was also an associate attorney at Downey Brand, practicing intellectual property and commercial law, and was a law clerk to Circuit Judge S. Jay Plager of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Washington DC. Professor Mireles taught Cross Border Trade in Intellectual Property in the George Washington University Law School summer program, part of the Munich Intellectual Property Law Center in Munich, Germany. He has also taught at the University of Denver, Sturm College of Law; Shanghai University of Finance and Economics; Zhejiang Gongshang University; and University of Salzburg. Professor Mireles received his JD from University of the Pacific, Order of the Coif, and LLM in intellectual property law from George Washington University Law School, with highest honors. He has served on the board of directors and with committees of several professional and community organizations, as President of the Asian Bar Association of Sacramento, and was appointed to the City of Sacramento Racial Profiling Commission by the Mayor of Sacramento.
Nicola Bianchi (Kellogg School of Management)
Max-Planck-Institut für Innovation und Wettbewerb, München, Raum 313
Promotions are an important component of a worker’s wage. Yet, traditional theories about the factors driving career progressions typically focus on worker-level characteristics like human capital acquisition, on learning, or on broad market-level factors like labor supply and demand. We study coworker-career spillovers that arise in firms with limited promotion opportunities. We exploit a 2011 Italian pension reform that tightened eligibility criteria for the public pension. We use administrative data on Italian private-sector and leverage cross-firm variation to isolate the effect of retirement delays among soon-to-retire workers on the promotions of their colleagues. We find evidence of career spillovers, and the patterns of these spillovers are consistent with the idea that older workers block the careers of their younger colleagues in firms with limited opportunities. Delays in retirement lead to a decrease in younger workers’ wage growth. Promotions from blue to white-collar positions fall in response to retirement delays among white-collar workers, whereas there is no effect of such delays among blue-collars. The effects are largest in firms with shrinking employment in the years leading up to the policy and negligible among fast-growing firms. We derive in a model the key features necessary to explain our results (with Giulia Bovini, Jin Li, Mateo Paradisi, and Michael Powell).
Ansprechpartner: Dr. Rainer Widmann
Enrico Berkes (Ohio State University)
Max-Planck-Institut für Innovation und Wettbewerb, München, Raum 313
We show that the historical rollout of public libraries increased the innovation output of recipient towns. Between 1886 and 1919, Andrew Carnegie donated $34.5 million (approximately $1 billion in 2019 dollars) to fund the construction of more than 1,500 public libraries across the United States. Drawing on a new data set based on original historical records, we identify cities that qualified to receive a library grant, applied for the program, received preliminary construction approval, but ultimately rejected Carnegie’s offer. Using the rejecting cities as a control group, we estimate the effects of Carnegie library formation on patenting activity. We provide evidence that the trends in the patenting activity in the two groups are indistinguishable before the construction of the libraries and then diverge. Cities that received grants experienced both short- and long-run gains in patenting activity.
Ansprechpartner: Dr. Rainer Widmann
