Veranstaltungen

Max-Planck-Institut für Innovation und Wettbewerb, Raum E10

Moderation: Benedikt Hammerschmid (MPI)

Max-Planck-Institut für Innovation und Wettbewerb, München, Raum 313

Public support for industry, either financial or in-kind, is predicated on the existence of unpaid and unrequited benefits flowing from one organisation to another. It follows that public support should be most generous where the outflows of these benefits are greatest. R&D activity is considered one notable source of these external benefits. There is now as strong and consistent body of evidence across the world that shows that firms, which interact or locate near R&D-active firms, receive considerable benefits. However, there is no reason why the magnitude of these benefits should be the same from all industries. Despite the quantity of studies, there has been scant evidence to indicate which sectors and what type of R&D produce the most benefits. This paper takes a step towards addressing this omission with the ultimate goal being the design of more targeted industry policies.

Ansprechpartner: Fabian Gaessler

Max-Planck-Insitut für Innovation und Wettbewerb, Raum E10

The bloxberg infrastructure is a permissioned blockchain network driven by Proof of Authority consensus (only selected nodes process transactions) and established by a consortium of leading research organizations worldwide. The bloxberg Consortium aims to fosters collaboration among the global scientific community, empowering researchers with robust, autonomous services that transcend institutional boundaries. For example, researchers can leverage bloxberg to create a transparent footprint of their work, without revealing its content. Starting with a research data certification system, the bloxberg infrastructure is destined to be extended and enhanced with tools and myriad decentralized applications (dAPPs) as research needs grow and shift. Furthermore, with consented transactions on the bloxberg infrastructure, research claims need not be limited to one institution alone, but can be confirmed by the whole trusted network. One vision is that the network itself may replace traditional scientific infrastructure such as closed-access publishing of research results. 
 

Ansprechpartner: Felix Pöge

Max-Planck-Institut für Innovation und Wettbewerb, München, Raum 313

We measure the value of connections with editorial boards by identifying the causal effect of board membership on publication success using membership rotation in a sample of over 100 economics journals over the period 1990-2011. We decompose the total effect on publication success in a direct effect on joining board members' publications and an indirect effect on the publications of various types of authors connected to joining members.
We find large effects, both at the aggregate, journal--department level and the individual board member-connected author level. Although the bulk of these effects are direct, indirect effects are large. More editorial power, captured by the member's role in the submission process, and long service on the editorial board lead to substantially larger increases. The effect is absent for Europe-based connected authors, equally strong for either gender and is stronger in generalist than in field journals.
We analyze various mechanisms. We find no evidence for publication success-enhancing information flowing from the journal to authors and little evidence of favoritism. The evidence is consistent with editors searching for papers in their networks and connections with members acting as signals.

Ansprechpartner: Michael Rose, Ph.D.

Max-Planck-Institut für Innovation und Wettbewerb, München, Raum 313

Scholarly work seeking to understand academics’ commercial activities often draws on abstract notions of the academic reward system and of the representative scientist. Few scholars have examined whether and how scientists’ motives to engage in commercial activities differ across fields. Similarly, efforts to understand academics’ choices have focused on three self-interested motives – recognition, challenge, and money – ignoring the potential role of the desire to have an impact on others. Using panel data for a national sample of over 2,000 academics employed at U.S. institutions, we examine how the four motives are related to commercial activity, measured by patenting. We find that all four motives predict patenting, but their role differs systematically between the life sciences, physical sciences, as well as engineering and applied sciences. These field differences are consistent with differences in the rewards from commercial activities, as well as with field differences in the opportunity costs of time spent away from “traditional” research, reflecting the degree of overlap between traditional and commercializable research. We discuss implications for policy makers, administrators, and managers as well as for future research on the scientific enterprise.

Ansprechpartner: Michael Rose

Max-Planck-Institut für Innovation und Wettbewerb, München, Raum 313

In absence of perfectly enforceable contracts economic theory predicts largely inefficient market outcomes. The solution to this problem is twofold: either costly contracts and regulations or trust and reciprocal behavior both result in stable and efficient equilibria. “Satisfaction guaranteed”, promising a full refund to the discontent customer, serves as a trust building device which has previously been shown to significantly improve market performance. In this paper, however, we show that the previous models of full refund guarantees fail to capture important features for either side of the contract. As a matter of fact, the guarantee does not necessarily reduce but rather realign the transaction risks. We assume that the possible temporary utilization of the contracted good creates virtually no costs for the customer but imposes considerable transaction costs on the seller. This creates a situation where the benefits of increased transactions through reassured customers have to countervail the possible losses from fraud in order to facilitate an efficient market equilibrium.

Anspechpartner: Marina Chugunova

Max-Planck-Institut für Innovation und Wettbewerb, München, Raum 313

We study the effects of immigration on the inventive performance of Switzerland, which, in between 1999 and 2007, first signed then gradually implemented an open border policy agreement with the European Union. During the transition phase, Switzerland progressively lifted all restrictions concerning foreign commuters from nearby countries, mostly highly skilled workers, whose visas were valid only for selected regions and whose employers were disproportionally located close to its international borders. Based on a rich dataset of patent applications filed at the European Patent Office (EPO) through the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) and a difference-in-differences estimation strategy, we find that the policy shock changed the migrant-native composition of the inventive workforce, and increased the quantity (albeit only in certain technological sectors) and the quality of Swiss patents. We also highlight an increase in the average size of R&D teams behind each patent application, a potential dynamic effect of skill-gap STEM immigration on domestic firms.

Ansprechpartner: Rainer Widmann

 Raum E10, Max-Planck-Institut für Innovation und Wettbewerb

Abstract
Competition authorities in Europe have taken enforcement action against the GAFA-companies (Google, Amazon, Facebook and Apple). The “theory of harm” in such cases remains vague, however, and it is disputed whether the cases are really cases for competition law enforcement or should be dealt with in other areas of the law – if there is any problem at all. The submission in the talk is that the agencies react to a shift in strategy by the so-called “super-platforms”: They are no longer acting as neutral intermediaries that primarily reduce transaction costs but meddle with the decision-making process of consumers and other companies.

In his talk, Professor Podszun submits economic and normative elements for a theory of harm in such cases. In his view, the agencies preserve the decision-making capacity of market participants – “digital autonomy” is, in his view, a key element of markets. Still, the question remains how competition law should react to the growing concerns with digital ecosystems. The talk therefore shall also serve as an impulse for discussing the overhaul of competition law that is under debate in Europe now.

If you plan on attending, we kindly request that you register with Ms. Ulrike Stubenvoll (ulrike.stubenvoll(at)miplc.de) at your earliest convenience.
 

Max-Planck-Institut für Innovation und Wettbewerb, Raum E10

Prof. Sapna Kumar ist Juraprofessorin in den USA und derzeit Gastwissenschaftlerin in der Abteilung Innovation and Entrepreneurship Research.

Moderation: Pedro Dias Batista

Max-Planck-Institut für Innovation und Wettbewerb, München, Raum 313

Innovation is a driver of many widely desired market outcomes, including higher quality, lower costs, more choices, greater efficiency and economic growth. Meanwhile, competition law is supposed to safeguard and foster competition in those markets. It therefore should play an important role in shaping incentives to innovate. Analyses of the effect of competition law on innovation, however, are scarce and suffer from two limitations. Theoretically, existing work—mostly in the law-and-economics tradition—tends to ignore the political and policy context of competition law. Empirically, existing analyses are almost all based on U.S. data—and they yield mixed results. This paper examines the relationship between competition law and innovation (as measured by patent filings) in its political context, and it does so in cross-sectional and panel analyses for a large number of jurisdictions. We find that competition law indeed has a strongly statistically significant and positive effect on the rate of innovation cross-nationally and over time—but only in the context high levels of state capacity and judicial independence.

Ansprechpartner: Felix Poege