Francisco Beneke wird zum Thema "Entry Analysis in Latin American Competition Law Enforcement - Why Development Matters" sprechen. Luc Desaunettes wird moderieren.
Institutsseminar: Entry Analysis in Latin American Competition Law Enforcement - Why Development Matters
18:00 Uhr, Francisco Beneke, Max-Planck-Institut für Innovation und Wettbewerb, München, Raum E10
Institutsseminar: Justification for a Legal Protection of Trade Secrets
18:00 Uhr, Luc Desaunettes, Max-Planck-Institut für Innovation und Wettbewerb, München, Raum E10
Luc Desaunettes will talk about Justification for a legal protection of trade secrets. Andrea Bauer will moderate.
TIME Kolloquium
Max-Planck-Institut für Innovation und Wettbewerb, München, Raum E10
Referent: Christian Steinle
Interdependency between Personality, Social Networks and Performance of Inventors – Approach and Preliminary Stage Results
Discussant: Hakan Ozalp (ISTO, LMU)
Referent: Frank Müller-Langer
Replication in Economics: A Matter of Impact (with Benedikt Fecher, Dietmar Harhoff and Gert G. Wagner)
Discussant: Karl Aschenbrücker (ISTO, LMU)/Thorsten Grohsjean (ISTO, LMU)
Munich IP Dispute Resolution Forum: The UPC Mediation and Arbitration Center
17:00 - 19:30 Uhr, Max-Planck-Institut für Innovation und Wettbewerb, München, Raum E10
Speaker: Dr. Margot Fröhlinger, Principal Director for Patent Law and Multilateral Affairs at EPO and Judge Sam Granata, External member of the UPC Legal Framework Groups “Rules on Procedure” and “Rules on Arbitration”.
Panel discussion with the main speakers and Dr. Armin Dürrschmidt, Partner, International Arbitration, Law Firm CMS Hasche Sigle and Dr. Michael Kock, Head of IP, Syngenta. Moderated by Dr. Peter Picht, LL.M. (Yale), Senior Research Fellow at the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, Munich.
Brown Bag-Seminar: Bias against Novelty in Science: A Cautionary Tale for Users of Bibliometric Indicators
Jian Wang (University of Leuven)
Abstract:
Research which explores unchartered waters has a high potential for major impact but also carries a high uncertainty of having minimal impact. Such explorative research is often described as taking a novel approach.
This study examines the complex relationship between pursuing a novel approach and impact. We measure novelty by examining the extent to which a published paper makes first time ever combinations of referenced journals, taking into account the difficulty of making such combinations. We apply this newly developed measure of novelty to a set of one million research articles across all scientific disciplines. We find that highly novel papers, defined to be those that make more (distinct) new combinations, have more than a triple probability of being a top 1% highly cited paper when using a sufficiently long citation time window to assess impact.
Moreover, follow-on papers that cite highly novel research are themselves more likely to be highly cited. However, novel research is also risky as it has a higher variance in the citation performance. These findings are consistent with the “high risk/high gain” characteristic of novel research.
We also find that novel papers are typically published in journals with a lower than expected Impact Factor and are less cited when using a short time window. Our findings suggest that science policy, in particular funding decisions which are over reliant on traditional bibliometric indicators based on short-term direct citation counts and Journal Impact Factors, may be biased against novelty. (Authors: Jian Wang/Reinhilde Veugelers/Paula Stephan)
Please drop us a line if you plan to attend.
Brown Bag-Seminar: The Economics of Patent Backlog
Alexandra Zaby (Universität Tübingen)
Abstract:
Patent offices around the world face massive backlogs of applications, which threatens to slow down the pace of technological progress. However, economists lack analytical tools to address the issue. This paper provides a model of patent backlog inspired from the traffic congestion literature.
Inventors in the cohort are heterogeneous with respect to desired patent pendency duration and react in anticipation of the waiting time resulting from the backlog. They can accelerate or slow down pendency duration by adapting their filing strategy. We find that the backlog impedes patent examination progress by providing incentives to strategically manipulate pendency.
We discuss three policy responses: increasing examination capacity; introducing a penalty fee; and altering the value of pending applications.
A Coherent Application of Articles 101 and 102: A Realistic Prospect or an Elusive Goal?
19:00 Uhr, Luc Peeperkorn, Max-Planck-Institut für Innovation und Wettbewerb, München, Raum E10
About the Speaker
Luc Peeperkorn is Principal Expert in Antitrust Policy at the European Commission. He studied economics and political science at the University of Amsterdam and worked as an assistant professor at the Erasmus University Rotterdam. He was a central figure in various teams which created what is now called the effects-based approach in EU competition policy, in particular by making new rules for supply and distribution agreements, for de minimis agreements and for technology transfer agreements. He also co-authored the Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 102. He teaches at the Brussels School of Competition and was recently a Senior Emile Noël Fellow at NYU.
Verfassungsrechtliche Anforderungen an den Patentschutz
18:00 - 19:30 Uhr, Hans-Jürgen Papier, Max-Planck-Institut für Innovation und Wettbewerb, München, Raum E10
Im Bereich der wirtschaftlichen Nutzung von Informations- und Kommunikationstechnologien findet seit einigen Jahren weltweit eine Art „Patentkrieg“ statt. Die von den Rechtsordnungen äußerst schlagkräftig geschmiedeten Waffen in jenen Auseinandersetzungen um Marktanteile und Umsatzerlöse in Bereichen wie etwa Smartphones, Tablet-PCs und Internettechnologien sind Patente, die Schlachtfelder in zunehmendem Maße gerichtliche Verfahren. Es stellt sich die Frage, ob das geltende deutsche Recht, insbesondere § 139 Abs. 1 PatG wegen der im Wesentlichen einschränkungslosen Zubilligung eines Unterlassungsanspruchs noch den verfassungsrechtlichen Anforderungen an Gesetze entspricht, die den Inhalt und die Schranken des Patenteigentums nach Art. 14 Abs. 1 S. 2 und Abs. 2 GG bestimmen. Es fehlt an einer ausreichenden normativen Vorsorge gegen unverhältnismäßige Beeinträchtigungen grundrechtlicher Belange Dritter bei der Ausübung des eigentumsrechtlichen Primärrechts. Bis zu einer gesetzlichen Neuregelung ist es Aufgabe der allgemein zuständigen Zivilgerichte, im Rahmen patentrechtlicher Verletzungsverfahren und bei der Beurteilung der Unterlassungsbegehren nach § 139 Abs. 1 PatG den verfassungsrechtlichen Anforderungen der gerechten Abwägung nach Maßgabe des Verhältnismäßigkeitsgrundsatzes Rechnung zu tragen.
Assistentenforum 2015: Koexistenz und Kumulation im Immaterialgüterrecht
09:00 - 18:00 Uhr, Max-Planck-Institut für Innovation und Wettbewerb, München, Raum E10
Thema des diesjährigen Forums ist „Koexistenz und Kumulation im Immaterialgüterrecht“. Eine ausführliche Beschreibung des Themas hat Thomas Jaeger dankenswerterweise in folgender Broschüre vorgenommen:
Beschreibung und Agenda
MIPLC Lecture Series: (IP) Negotiations as Multi-Party Joint Decision-Making
18:00 - 19:30 Uhr, Max-Planck-Institut für Innovation und Wettbewerb, München, Raum E10
Referent: Jan Walter
The main purpose of this seminar is to turn away from understanding negotiations as competition with a winner and a looser and rather to appreciate negotiations for their potential to enlarge the pie, the value of the final result. For a good negotiator to be able to reap the benefits, phase of preparations is not to be underestimated. This is especially so with the world of multilateral negotiations turning from monetary-based bargaining to value-based argumentation.
Two intertwined angles will be offered – the science of negotiation and the art thereof. The seminar will strive to go further, to multilateral dimension. Due to general demands for higher transparency in any negotiations and the growing number of relevant players in international organizations, the number of actors and stakeholders is on the rise. Multilateral is an increasingly common form of negotiations – in business, public sector, inter-governmental arena. The lecture will explore the potential benefits and pitfalls of third-party intervention, for example mediation, facilitation or chairing. Further, if time permits, coalition-building, coalition-maintenance and coalition-destruction will be examined as useful but dangerous tools to use.
Practical examples mainly, but not exclusively, from international IP negotiations will be used to support the notions.
About Jan Walter: With his background neither in law nor in IP, Jan enters the MIPLC grounds with a slightly different value proposition; one of an advocacy professional and negotiator. Jan’s academic background lies in international trade, international politics and international management, studied at the University of Economics in Prague and the London School of Economics and Political Science. After short experience in business environment, Jan joined the Czech civil service on the dynamic wave of the first-ever Czech Presidency of EU Council. Jan remained working for his government for seven years, most of it in Geneva. His responsibilities included, inter alia, WIPO where he eventually chaired one of the regional groups and was able to witness few successes and many failures at the inner-most negotiating table. After leaving the public service in early 2015, Jan focused his interest and experience to educational activities and recently also joined the world of lobbying on behalf of animal protection.