Veranstaltungen

European Patent Office, Isar Building, Bob-van-Benthem-Platz 1, 80469 Munich,
Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, Marstallplatz 1, 80539 Munich

Max-Planck-Institut für Innovation und Wettbewerb, München, Raum E10

From March 16 to 18, 2017, the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition will organize the workshop “European Intellectual Property Rights and Jurisdiction in Need of a Grand Design?” which will focus on four areas:

• Legal Aspects: Union-wide IP Rights plus Copyrights: The Status Quo including the Role of the ECJ (chair: Matthias Leistner); Patents: The Status Quo including EPO and UPC and the Role of the ECJ (chair: Axel Metzger),
• Empirical Insights (chair: Annette Kur): EU Trade Mark Infringement Litigation; Patent Litigation,
• Deficits and Perspectives in the Jurisdiction of IP Rights (chair: Paul Torremans), and
• Conclusions: In Need of a Grand Design? (chair: Reto Hilty).

The goal of the workshop is to identify deficits and research perspectives for further developing the EU jurisdiction scheme.

The workshop will be held at the Harnackhaus in Berlin. Participation is by invitation only.

See Program

Max-Planck-Institut für Innovation und Wettbewerb, München, Raum E10

Max-Planck-Institut für Innovation und Wettbewerb, München, Raum 313

The increasing ability to organize information and transmit it to the market is ushering in an era where economic actors are highly responsive to the market. These shifts are particularly pronounced in the emerging technology space of the Internet of Things. Central to these disruptive innovations is a change in business operations, which has altered the architecture and conceptualization in how interactions occur; a transformation, which the patent system has not necessarily caught up with yet. Against this background this study investigates what patent governance regimes are needed in a European Union context so to assure that the Internet of Things enables the success of Small- and Medium Sized Enterprises (SMEs). It does so, by means of a survey among SMEs active in the IOT space. In light of the evidence gathered, the study then identifies key components of 'good governance' for patent law and provide recommendations for policy makers that will allow to set the baseline for an 'Internet of Things for All.'

Ansprechpartner: Dr. Fabian Gaessler

Max-Planck-Institut für Innovation und Wettbewerb, München, Raum 313

We study the impact of the dual trademark system that was established in the European Union in 1996. Using a novel data set, we document that the new EU Trademark (EUTM) is a success story: the majority of new marks in EU Member States are now protected by the EUTM. The EUTM reduced the demand for national trademarks: on average, it crowded out 25% of national filings; this effect was much stronger for small countries and for foreign applicants. The EUTM also led to an overall increase in the number of marks protected in the EU, indicating easier market access. Finally, using a back-of-the-envelope calculation, we document that the EUTM generates substantial savings for the business sector. (Co-Autor: Benedikt Herz)

Ansprechpartner: Dr. Fabian Gaessler

Max-Planck-Institut für Innovation und Wettbewerb, München, Raum 313

Why do some people become entrepreneurs when it is not optimal? We explore this question by disentangling two mechanisms that may have been confounded: overconfidence and attitude toward uncertainty. Following Frank Knight (1921), we further distinguish between two types of uncertainty: risk and ambiguity. In a laboratory experiment, we shock individuals’ level of confidence in their skills to causally identify the effect of overconfidence on entry into competitive markets. Moreover, we highlight the critical role of attitude toward ambiguity on entry: independent of their level of confidence, individuals exhibit ambiguity-seeking behavior when the result of the competition depends on their skills, which in turn leads to a higher level of entry. This preference for ambiguity can explain results that have previously been attributed to overconfidence. Finally, we observe that excess entry does not always occur but, rather, depends on the intensity of competition and whether the result of the competition depends on individuals’ skills (co-authored with Thomas Åstebro).

Max-Planck-Institut für Innovation und Wettbewerb, München, Raum E10

Max-Planck-Institut für Innovation und Wettbewerb, München, Raum 313

Research and product or process development are two distinct, yet complementary innovation activities. Making use of a specific grant-based policy design that explicitly distinguishes between research projects, development projects, and mixed R&D projects, this study estimates the direct and cross scheme effects on both research and development investments of recipient firms. Positive cross scheme effects can be expected when research and development activities are complementary and financing constraints are more binding for research than for development projects. The results show that while research grants yield positive direct effects on net research spending as well as positive cross effects on development, development grants are less effective for stimulating development expenditures. The positive effect of development grants on overall R&D stems from cross effects of development grants on research expenditures. These results suggest a higher priority for subsidies targeting research projects.

Max-Planck-Institut für Innovation und Wettbewerb, München, Raum 313

A probabilistic patent, that is, a patent with significant invalidation possibility, can significantly hamper the innovation enhancing role of a patent system. It may allow a patentee-licensor to command a disproportionately strong power over licensees. A probabilistic patent may also fail to effectively promote the investment by a patentee-manufacturer for developing the invention. A third party may be able to substantially contribute to reducing the problems of probabilistic patent through information submissions and post-grant oppositions.

This study examines such possibilities based on Japanese experiences which have extensively used an information submission system. More specifically we ask the following three questions.

(1) Which patent application is more likely to be challenged by information submissions?

(2) How effective are such challenges?

(3) How do third party contributions affect the quality of patent examination?

Ansprechpartner: Dr. Fabian Gaessler