Vertical Restraints under Indian Competition Law: Whither Law and Economics Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 10, 1 (2022), 194 - 215.
The correct welfare assessment of vertical agreements in competition law is a difficult craft. The more mature jurisdictions such as the EU and the US have struggled to develop the optimal framework. This article scrutinizes vertical agreements cases of the Competition Commission of India (CCI) that is now 11 years old. The objective is to assist the CCI in strengthening its legal and economic framework vis-à-vis vertical agreements in its formative stage. The scrutiny of some leading cases revealed three types of infirmities in CCI’s cases. First, there are some legal ambiguities in the interpretation of the legislation. Secondly, the economic analysis is largely incoherent and truncated. Thirdly, there is a visible overreliance on the EU jurisprudence that does not conform to the legislative scheme of the Indian Competition Act, 2002. The article draws out some lessons towards the end.
Also published as: Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No. 20-04
