Theoretical Evolution and Development of the Collective Dominance Competition Policy Research 1 (2022), 81 - 93.
The collective dominance regime, originating from EU competition law, is a powerful enforcement tool for antitrust authorities because it can both prevent market structure from tipping towards tacit collusion in merger cases ex ante and stop the abuse of market dominant position ex post. However, current research has failed to pay sufficient attention to the theoretical and practical value of collective dominance in ex ante and ex post regulation, as evidenced by the focus on single dominance rather than collective dominance, focus on the elements of determination rather than identification of abuse, and the fact that existing research is mostly based on the background of the industrial economy without considering the digital economy. Compared with the EU competition law, the relevant provisions of China’s Anti-monopoly law are vaguer. In order to strengthen antitrust and meet the competition challenges in the digital economy, it is necessary to construct and improve the analytical framework of prohibition of abuse and coordinated effects, so as to fully leverage the advantages of the collective dominance in strengthening the antitrust regulatory force and regulating algorithmic tacit collusion with lower evidential requirements.
