Prof. Dr. Hanns Ullrich
Affiliated Research Fellow
Intellectual Property and Competition Law
+49 89 24246-429
hanns.ullrich(at)ip.mpg.de
Academic Résumé
Hanns ULLRICH, Prof. Dr. (i.R.), born 1939 (Jena/Thüringen)
Graduated from the University of Tübingen (1964)
Dr. iur. (Freie Universität Berlin 1969)
M.C.J. (N.Y. Univ. 1971/75)
Dr. iur. habil (Munich 1982)
Dr.eh. (Zurich 2015)
Professor Universität der Bundeswehr Munich (1985-2004)
Chair of Competition Law and Intellectual Property Law, European University Institute/Florence (2000/2001 and 2003-2006)
Rédacteur en chef, Revue internationale de droit économique (2003–2012)
Visiting professor College of Europe (since 1991), Bruges (Belgium)
Associate researcher Max-Planck-Institute for Innovation and Competition, Munich
Co-editor International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law
Academic Prizes and Honours
Dr. h.c. University Zurich, Faculty of Law
Prix Franco-Allemand Gay Lussac Humboldt, Ministère de la Jeunesse et de la Recherche, 2003
Chaire Paul Foriers, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Faculté de droit (1989 - 90)
Memberships
- Advisory editorial committees of "Computer und Recht" and "Temas de Derecho Industrial y de la Competencia"
- Conseil administratif, Association internationale de droit économique
- Antitrust Law Committee, Deutsche Vereinigung für Gewerblichen Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht
- Kuratorium Ifo-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Munich (2000-2008)
- Chair, Committee of Software Contracting and Member of the Advisory Committee, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Recht und Informatik (1991 - 2005)
- Chair, Expert Group on "Innovation-oriented Regulation of Intellectual Property Resulting from Publicly Funded RandD", Federal Ministry of Science, Education, Research and Development (1995 - 1997)
- Member of the Commission for the Establishment of the Faculty of Economics at the Bergakademie Freiberg (1991 - 1993)
- Dean and Vice-Dean, Faculty of Economic and Organisational Sciences, Member of the Senate Universität der Bundeswehr München (1988 - 1996)
Publications
Edited Works
Kritika - Essays on Intellectual Property - Volume 6, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA 2024, 240
Kritika - Essays on Intellectual Property - Volume 5, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA 2021, XIV + 209
The Impact of Brexit on Unitary Patent Protection and its Court (Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition Research Paper, No. 18-20), Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, Munich 2018, 182
- Rezensiert von: Winfried Tilmann, GRUR Int. 2018, S. 1094
- 18-20.pdf
Kritika - Essays on Intellectual Property - Volume 3, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA 2018, XVI + 197
Kritika - Essays on Intellectual Property - Volume 2, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA 2017, xv + 195
Le droit économique entre intérêts privés et intérêt public – Hommage à Laurence Boy, PUAM, Presses Universitaires d'Aix-Marseille, Aix-en-Provence 2016, 374
TRIPS plus 20 - From Trade Rules to Market Principles (MPI Studies on Intellectual Property and Competition, 25), Springer, Heidelberg; Berlin 2016, XVII + 760
- Rezensiert von: Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, IIC 2017, S. 245
Kritika - Essays on Intellectual Property - Volume 1, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA 2015, 329
Intellectual Property, Market Power, and the Public Interest (College of Europe studies, 8), Lang, Brussels 2008, 315
Intellectual Property, Public Policy and International Trade (College of Europe Studies, 6), Lang, Brussels 2007, 232
Der internationale Softwarevertrag nach deutschem und ausländischen Recht (Schriftenreihe Kommunikation & Recht, 26), 2.
The Evolution of European Competition Law - Whose Regulation, Which Competition? (ASCOLA Competition Law series ), Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2006, VIII + 370
- Event: Workshop on Comparative Competition Law, Florenz, 2004
Comparative Competition Law - Approaching an International System of Antitrust Law, Nomos, Baden-Baden 1998, 294
Information als Wirtschaftsgut - Management und Rechtsgestaltung (Informationstechnik und Recht, 5), Schmidt, Köln 1997, IX + 237
Der internationale Softwarevertrag (Schriftenreihe Recht der internationalen Wirtschaft, 47), Verlag Recht und Wirtschaft, Heidelberg 1995, 1143
Guidelines for the Management and Exploitation of Patented Inventions of Research and Development Institutions in Developing Countries (WIPO Publication, No. 668 (E)), World Intellectual Property Organization, Geneva 1989, 84
Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz - Urheberrecht - Wirtschaftsrecht - Mitarbeiterfestschrift für Eugen Ulmer mit Beiträgen aus dem deutschen, ausländischen und internationalen Recht, Heymanns, Köln, Berlin, Bonn, München 1973, XII + 587
Revue internationale de droit économique, De Boeck, Brüssel.
Books and Monographs
Technology Transfer Agreements under EC-Competition Law, CEIPI, Strasbourg 1997, 35
Kooperative Forschung und Kartellrecht - eine Kritik der Wettbewerbsaufsicht über die Forschungsgemeinschaften in den USA, der EWG und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Verlag Recht und Wirtschaft, Heidelberg 1988, 222
Staatliche Forschungsförderung und Patentschutz im internationalen Vergleich: Westeuropa - Länderberichte Frankreich, Großbritannien, Niederlande, Schweden und Rechtsvergleichung (Staatliche Forschungsförderung und Patentschutz, 3), VCH, Weinheim 1985, XX + 451
Privatrechtsfragen der Forschungsförderung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Staatliche Forschungsförderung und Patentschutz, 2), Verlag Chemie, Weinheim 1984, XVIII + 521
Standards of Patentability for European Inventions - Should an Inventive Step Advance the Art? (IIC Studies, 1), Verlag Chemie, Weinheim 1977, XXI + 116
Rechtsschutz gegen überbetriebliche Normen der Technik (Abhandlungen aus dem gesamten Bürgerlichen Recht, Handelsrecht und Wirtschaftsrecht, 42), Enke, Stuttgart 1971, VIII + 75
Das Recht der Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen des Gemeinsamen Marktes und die einzelstaatliche Zivilgerichtsbarkeit (Schriften zum Prozeßrecht, 22), Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 1971, XX + 459
Contributions to Collected Editions, Commentaries, Handbooks and Encyclopaedias
Zur besonderen Verantwortung marktbeherrschender Unternehmen, in: Kreation Innovation Märkte - Creation Innovation Markets - Festschrift Reto M. Hilty, Springer, Berlin; Heidelberg 2024, 1095 - 1114. DOI
- Bei der Anwendung von Art. 102 AEUV, dem Verbot missbräuchlicher Ausnutzung einer marktbeherrschenden Stellung, geht der Gerichtshof der EU in ständiger Rechtsprechung davon aus, dass Unternehmen, die eine marktbeherrschende Stellung innehaben, unabhängig von den Ursachen einer solchen Stellung eine besondere Verantwortung dafür tragen, dass sie durch ihr Verhalten einen wirksamen und unverfälschten Wettbewerb auf dem Binnenmarkt nicht beeinträchtigen. Der Beitrag geht den Gründen und Folgen dieser besonderen Verantwortung nach.
The Role of the Court of Justice of the European Union, in: Matthew Duncan, Paul Torremans (
Harmonization of Employee Invention Laws: The Black Hole of the EU's Innovation Policy, in: Gustavo Ghidini, Valeria Falce (
Klimawandel im EU-Kartellrecht, in: Thomas Jaeger, Rainer Palmstorfer (
- Art. 11 AEUV verlangt von den Organen der Europäischen Union, dass sie die Erfordernisse des Umweltschutzes bei der Festlegung und Durchführung der Unionspolitiken und -maßnahmen insbesondere zur Förderung einer nachhaltigen Entwicklung einbeziehen. Dieses Kohärenzgebot gilt auch für Ausführung und Anwendung der Wettbewerbsregeln des Vertrags, die Unternehmen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen und den Missbrauch von Marktmacht verbieten (Art. 101, 102 AEUV). Art. 11 AEUV wird deshalb von vielen Seiten vor allem für die Rechtfertigung von wettbewerbsbeschränkenden Vereinbarungen und Verhaltensweisen herangezogen, die dem Umweltschutz förderlich sind, seltener auch, um dem Umweltschutz abträgliche Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen strenger zu sanktionieren. Seine Tragfähigkeit ist jedoch begrenzt. Entgegen einer anschwellenden Literatur und einer sich angesichts des Klimawandels wandelnden behördlichen Aufsichtspraxis ist Zurückhaltung gegenüber einer Berücksichtigung des Umweltschutzes geboten, der als besonderes öffentliches Interesse dem Wettbewerb allgemein vorgehen, jedenfalls aber seine Beschränkung durch Beschlüsse von Unternehmensvereinigungen und Unternehmenskooperationen oder die Ausnutzung von Marktmacht erlauben soll. Angesichts seines alle Wirtschaftsbereiche erfassenden Geltungsanspruchs lässt sich weder eine allgemeine Ausnahmeregel noch eine Abweichung der Behandlung umweltschutzrelevanter Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen von den wohl verstandenen, ausreichend offenen und interdependenten Kriterien des Art. 101, insbesondere seines Absatzes 3, und des Art. 102 AEUV rechtfertigen. Ein dementsprechend umsichtiges Vorgehen verlangt die Doppelnatur der Wettbewerbsregeln als solche behördlicher Aufsicht und privater Durchsetzbarkeit, ihre institutionelle und grundrechtliche Fundierung und das Verhältnis von Umwelt- und Wettbewerbsschutz als einerseits Rahmenordnung, andererseits Funktionsprinzip des Binnenmarktes. Demgegenüber satteln Lehren, die dem für den Umweltschutz notwendigen nachhaltigen Wirtschaftsverhalten statt durch freien Wettbewerb durch dessen Beschränkung zu der wünschenswerten allgemeinen Beachtung und Breitenwirkung verhelfen wollen, das Pferd von hinten auf. Sie gefährden damit unnötig ihr eigenes, berechtigtes Anliegen, dass dem Umweltschutz bei letztlich allen wirtschaftlichen Tätigkeiten bestmöglich genügt werden sollte.
- Article 11 TFEU provides that “environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and implementation of the Union’s policies and activities, in particular with a view to promoting sustainable development”. This principle of consistency of EU policies applies also to the implementation and the application of the rules on competition that prohibit restrictions of competition by agreements or concerted practices of enterprises or by abuses of market power. Therefore, Art. 11 TFEU is often relied upon as a justification of restrictions of competition that promote the protection of the environment and, though more rarely, also as a reason to more severely sanction anticompetitive practices that harm the environment. However, the rule is of limited reach only. Contrary to an increasing wave of literature and to a change of practice competition authorities are about to undertake in the face of climate change, a reserved attitude is warranted toward claims invoking environmental protection as a public interest that would take precedence over competition or that would allow admitting restrictions of competition by decisions of associations of undertakings, by cooperation between firms or by the exercise of market power. Since the need to protect the environment extends to all areas of the economy, no general rule of exemption is appropriate, nor may the legality of environmentally relevant restrictions of competition be determined in ways that depart from the well-conceived, sufficiently open and interdependent terms of Art. 101, in particular of Art. 101(3), and of Art. 102 TFEU. Rather, a cautious, circumspect approach is mandated by the double nature of Arts. 101 and 102 TFEU as rules of administrative and of private enforcement, by the institutional principles and fundamental rights upon which the EU’s competitive order is grounded, and by the interdependence that exists between the protection of the environment as a framework regulation of the market on the one hand and, on the other, free and open competition as the operational principle of the Internal Market. Doctrines that by favoring restricted over free competition seek to promote the general observance and broad acceptance of sustainable conduct as is necessary to protect the environment actually suggest saddling the horse from the tail. They, thus, risk frustrating their own legitimate concern, which is that any economic activity ought to comply with the protection of the environment in the best possible way.
- Also published as: Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Discussion Paper No. 20
Technology Protection and Competition Policy for the Information Economy - From Property Rights for Competition to Competition Without Proper Rights?, in: Penser le droit de la pensée – Mélanges en l'honneur de Michel Vivant, Dalloz, Paris 2020, 457 - 484.
- Over the years, the focus of competition law enforcement regarding the anticompetitive exercise of intellectual property rights has changed considerably. It first shifted from restrictive licensing to the control of refusals to license by market dominating owners of intellectual property (IP). However, it was only in view of exceptional circumstances that competition authorities and courts have considered refusals to constitute an abuse of market power within the meaning of Art. 102 TFEU. The shift became more pronounced when open innovative standardization led to conflicts between market dominating holders of patents reading on interface standards and standard implementers who did not (yet) have or did not have asked for a license. Under the rules of institutionalized open standardization, the holders of patents that are essential for the use of the standard are subject to an obligation to grant licenses at FRAND conditions, thus limiting the availability of injunctive relief from the infringement of their standard essential patents (SEPs). However, the scope and operation of such FRAND commitments, in particular their impact on the patentee’s right to exclude, was controversial under both patent law and competition law. It was by way of an SEP-specific reading of Art. 102 TFEU that the Court of Justice of the EU sought to calm down the conflict. Thus, in its Huawei/ZTE decision, it subjected the holders of SEPs and the implementers of standards to a mandatory, quasi-regulatory framework for FRAND negotiations. For all systems technologies whose operation depends on open interface standardization, this FRAND negotiation framework supersedes the former exceptional circumstances test for assessing abusive refusals to license. Therefore, the shift regarding the implementation of competition policy is a systematic one, albeit one that is limited to IP covering standardization.
By contrast, the needs of data accessibility that characterize the digital economy seem to ask for yet another, even broader shift of competition policy and law enforcement. Most lawyers in the fields of both intellectual property and competition law assume that in cases of refusal of access based on some form of IP, in particular on the protection of trade secrets and/or on technical protection measures (TPM), competition law will already provide the necessary remedies for ensuring sufficiently broad access to data. Therefore, they assume that, contrary to the ideas of a minority of academics and the views of some industries, there is not only no need for creating any specific form of “data ownership” or “data producer rights” , but that such additional category of IP would hinder the free development of and innovation in the data economy. The question, however, precisely is whether trade in and sharing of data might benefit from access rules that are not tied to the narrow criteria of controlling the anticompetitive exercise of market power, but instead form part of a broader regulatory framework that would overcome the present de facto distribution of control over and access to data by establishing a proper balance between the rights and duties of data controllers and data users, in particular by providing for a genuine complementarity between individual entitlement and third party access rights. Among the many difficult issues the design of such a new framework will raise, the notion of “property” stands out as a major hurdle to conceptualizing a rights-based regime that combines incentives for the creation and curation of data with such broad rights to access as are needed for the efficient use of multi-purpose data, for transparent trade in and sufficient sharing of data in a dynamic digital economy. The study is not aimed at overcoming that hurdle. It assumes that much of the necessary concepts already exist. However, quite some research is still needed for putting these pieces of a puzzle into the picture of a market order that as a matter of law guarantees all market actors a level playing field by providing for an adequate and efficient distribution of rights, limitations and duties between the holders and the users of data on the one hand, and, on the other, ensures freedom of competition by virtue of rules outlawing anticompetitive practices. After all, it is not the objective and not the function of competition law to order markets, but only to prevent practices that unduly distort or restrict competition. The market order itself is a matter of a framework regulation by general law. - Also published as: Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No. 19-12
The European Union’s Patent System After Brexit: Disunited, but Unified?, in: Matthias Lamping, Hanns Ullrich (
General Introduction, in: Matthias Lamping, Hanns Ullrich (
EuGH und EPG im Europäischen Patentschutzsystem: Wer hat was zu sagen? - Versuch einer Standortbestimmung, in: Methodenfragen des Patentrechts - Theo Bodewig zum 70. Geburtstag (Geistiges Eigentum und Wettbewerbsrecht, 136), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2018, 229 - 260.
- Die Stellung des Gerichtshofs der Europäischen Union (EuGH) und des künftigen einheitlichen Patent-gerichts (EPG) zueinander beruht auf einem Spannungsverhältnis, das seinen Ursprung in der wechsel-vollen Entstehungsgeschichte von Europäischem Patent mit einheitlicher Wirkung (Einheitspatent) und EPG hat. Einerseits hat der EuGH in seinem Gutachten 1/09 das ursprünglich vorgesehene Abkommen über ein Gericht für das Europäische und das Europäische Unionspatent (EEUPG) unter anderem mit der Begründung für primärrechtswidrig erklärt, dass so einem internationalen Gericht statt den einzel-staatlichen Gerichten als „ordentlichen“ Unionsgerichten eine umfassende Zuständigkeit auf dem Ge-biet des unionsrechtlichen Patentschutzes zugewiesen und dadurch das von Art. 267 AEUV vorausge-setzte Zusammenarbeitsverhältnis zwischen EuGH und den nationalen Gerichten beeinträchtigt werde. Die Mitgliedstaaten der verstärkten Zusammenarbeit haben daraufhin im EPG-Übereinkommen (EPG-Ü) die Errichtung des EPG als ein ihnen gemeinsames Gericht vereinbart, das Teil ihres jeweiligen Ge-richtssystems sein und wie ihre innerstaatlichen Gerichte mit dem EUGH bei der Auslegung des Uni-onsrechts in dem Vorabentscheidungsverfahren des Art. 267 AEUV zusammenwirken soll. Anderer-seits scheint die EU Verordnung Nr.1257/2012 über das europäische Patent mit einheitlicher Wirkung die dem EuGH durch Art. 267 AEUV aufgetragene Aufgabe der Wahrung der unionsweit einheitlichen Auslegung des Unionsrechts dadurch auszuhöhlen, dass sie in Art. 5 Abs. 3 für die Bestimmung der Handlungen, gegen die das Einheitspatent Schutz bietet und für die insoweit geltenden Beschränkungen auf das nationale Recht, letztlich auf die entsprechenden Vorschriften des EPG-Übereinkommens verweist. Infolgedessen droht die Bestimmung der Substanz des Schutzes, nämlich Inhalt und Reichweite des Ausschließlichkeitsrechts, der Zuständigkeit des EuGH von vornherein entzogen und dem EPG vorbehalten zu sein.
Die Studie versucht das angesprochene Spannungsverhältnis in zwei Schritten aufzulösen. In einem erst-en Abschnitt stellt sie die Stellung des EuGH im allgemeinen Gerichtssystem des unionsrechtlichen und des unionsrechtlich angeglichenen einzelstaatlichen Immaterialgüterschutzes dar. Dabei betont sie zum einen die zentrale Stellung des EuGH. Zum anderen arbeitet sie heraus, dass ihm nicht nur die Wahrung der Einheitlichkeit der Unionsrechtsauslegung, sondern vor allem auch die Ausbildung und Weiterentwicklung des auf autonomen Unionsrecht beruhenden sowie des durch Unionsrecht an-geglichenen Schutzrechtssystems obliegt. In einem zweiten Abschnitt wird zunächst das in der Union bestehende Patentschutzsystem analysiert, das in die Schutzoptionen des europäisch erteilen nichtein-heitlichen, des einzelstaatlich erteilten und teilangeglichenen und des europäisch erteilten einheitlichen Patents zerfällt. Die im Zusammenhang der Studie erheblichen Kennzeichen dieses Schutzsystems sind, erstens, dass dem EuGH im Bereich des angeglichenen einzelstaatlichen Patentschutzes die Wahrung einheitlicher Rechtsauslegung unbestritten weiterhin obliegt und zwar auch dort, wo sich dem EPG gleiche Rechtsfragen stellen können. Zweitens erweist sich der Schutz des Einheitspatents also nicht nur seiner Geltung, (Art. 3 Abs. 1 VO 1257/2012), sondern auch seinem Inhalt und Umfang nach weitgehend unionsrechtlich fundiert, weil der Ausschließlichkeitsanspruch von Art. 5 Art. 1 VO 1257/2012 begründet und nach Art. 3 Abs. 2 und Art. 5 Abs. 2 VO 1257/2012 in seiner ganzen Aus-prägung unionsweit (d.h. im ganzen Gebiet der verstärkten Zusammenarbeit) einheitlich sein soll. Drit-tens fällt der Schutz des europäisch erteilten, nicht einheitlichen Patents nicht nur insoweit in die Aus-legungszuständigkeit auch des EuGH als das EPG-Ü selbst sachliches oder verfahrensrechtliches Uni-onsrecht in Bezug nimmt oder seinem Vorrang unterliegt, sondern auch, weil es funktional einer Rechtsangleichung des nationalen Patentverletzungsrechts entspricht, zu der sich die Mitgliedstaaten im Hinblick auf die Schaffung eines gemein-samen, das europäische Bündelpatent und das Einheitspatent nach identischen Regeln beurteilenden Gerichts entschlossen haben.
Die infolgedessen scheinbar sehr weit reichende Letztauslegungszuständigkeit des EuGH wird in einem letzten Teil des zweiten Abschnitts der Studie im Hinblick auf die dem EPG von den Mitgliedstaaten im EPG-Ü zugedachte Rolle als einheitliche Fachgerichtsbarkeit auf einen zweck- und praxisgerechten Umfang zurückgeführt. Zum einen ergibt sich schon aus der Ausschließlichkeit und Zentralisierung der Zuständigkeit des EPG, dass die Wahrung der Einheitlichkeit von Rechtsauslegung und -anwendung des Rechs auf seinem Fachgebiet von ihm gesichert wird und vom EuGH nicht zusätzlich wahrgenommen zu werden braucht. Zum anderen wird die dem EuGH weiterhin auch im Bereich von Einheitspatent und EPO/EPG-Ü Bündelpatent zufallende Funktion der integrativen Weiterentwicklung des Patentschutzes an sich und als Teil der Wirtschaftsrechtsordnung der EU und ihres Binnenmarktes nach Art. 267 AEUV nicht hierarchisch, sondern in einem Rechtsgespräch zwischen Richtern gleich-rangiger Gerichte, eben in einem Zusammenarbeitsverhältnis, wahrgenommen. Schon im Interesse der allgemeinen Akzeptanz seiner eng spezialisierten Rechtsprechung wird das EPG dieses der gemeinsamen und einheitlichen Rechtsinterpretation und nur dieser dienende Richtergespräch von sich aus aufnehmen müssen. - Due to the turbulent legislative history of the European patent with unitary effect (unitary patent) and of the Unified Patent Court (UPC), the relationship between the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the future UPC is bound to become a tense one. On the one hand, in its opinion 1/09, the CJEU has held the Agreement on a European and European Patent Court as originally foreseen to be incompatible with primary Union law. One of the grounds of incompatibility was that an international court rather than the “ordinary” courts of the Union, namely the national courts, would become vested with broad jurisdiction in the Union’s own field of patent protection and thus might interfere with the cooperative relationship between the CJEU and the national courts as required by Art. 267 TFEU with respect to the uniform interpretation of Union law. Thereupon, almost all of the EU Member States participating in enhanced cooperation for the creation of unitary patent protection concluded an agreement on the establishment of the UPC as a court common to all of them and forming part of their judicial system and that, within the procedure established by Art. 267 TFEU, would have to cooperate like their national courts with the CJEU as regards the interpretation of Union law. On the other hand, EU Regulation no.1257/2012 on the European patent with unitary effect seems to undercut the CJEU’s competence to safeguard the uniform interpretation of Union law throughout the Union in that, as regards determining the acts against which the unitary patents provides protection and the limitations thereto, Art. 5(3) refers to national law, ultimately to the relevant rules of substantive law of the EPC Agreement. As a result, the very substance of protection, i.e. the contents and the scope of the exclusivity conferred upon the proprietor of a unitary patent appears to remain a priori outside the CJEU’s jurisdiction and reserved to that of the UPC.
In a two steps-approach, the study seeks to define a less tense, more cooperative relationship between the CJEU and the EPC. A first section is concerned with examining the position of CJEU within the general judicial system of the protection of unionist intellectual property and of harmonized national intellectual property. The focus is on the central role the CJEU plays and has to play, and on that it is not only charged with safeguarding the uniformity of the interpretation of Union law, but also with implementing and further developing the Union’s system of intellectual property protection, be it Union intellectual property rights or national rights as harmonized by Union law. The second section presents, first, the system of patent protection that exists in the Union and that is composed of various options, in particular of the non-unitary European patent granted by the European Patent Organization (EPO), of partly harmonized national patents granted nationally, and of the European patent with unitary effect post grant. The characteristic features of this compromise system that are relevant in the context of the paper are, first, that as regards the harmonized elements of national patent protection the CJEU will remain in charge of safeguarding the uniform interpretation of Union law, and will so even in regard of legal issues that may also arise in litigation before the EPC. Second, protection by the unitary patent rests on Union law not only as regards its legal basis (Art. 3(1) Reg. 1257/2012), but also as regards its substance and scope, because it is Art. 5(1) Reg. 1257/2012 that establishes the right to exclusivity and because Art. 3(2) and Art. 5(2) Reg. 1257/2012 require that exclusivity to be uniform as to its scope throughout the Union (i.e. the territory of enhanced cooperation). Third, as regards the non-unitary European bundle of patents, its protection comes within the CJEU’s interpretative jurisdiction not only to the extent that the EPC Agreement directly refers to substantive or procedural Union law or is subject to primacy of Union law, but also to the extent that, in functional terms, Art. 25 to 27 of the UPC Agreement constitute a measure of harmonization of national law on patent infringement, upon which EU Member States have agreed in view of the creation precisely of a common court charged with the enforcement on identical terms of both unitary protection and non-unitary European patents.
Since, as a result, the competence of the CJEU to have the final say on the interpretation of Union law appears to be rather broad, a final section aims at defining its inherent and practical limits with a view to the role that Member States wish the UPC to fulfill, namely that precisely of a unified and specialized patent law judiciary. For one thing, due to its exclusive jurisdiction and centralized organization, the UPC will by itself ensure the uniform interpretation and application of the law in its special field so that there is no need for the CJEU to duplicate this task. For another, it is not by virtue of a hierarchical order, but by way of communicative interaction between judges of courts of equal rank, so by way of cooperation, that just as in its traditional relationship with national courts the CJEU will continue fulfilling the integrationist function conferred upon it by Art. 267 TFEU also in regard of unitary patent protection and non-unitary European patent protection, namely that of further developing by way of interpretation (rather than application) unionist and Union-related patent law as such and as part of the broader EU legal-economic order. The UPC will have enough reason and opportunities to enter into that communicative cooperation with the CJEU, not least to see its specialized judicial practice generally accepted. - Also published as: Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Discussion Paper No. 8
Preface, in: Hanns Ullrich et al. (
The Political Foundations of TRIPS Revisited, in: Hanns Ullrich et al. (
- The contribution revisits the political foundations of the TRIPS Agreement with a view to determine its role and functioning under the changed socio-economic geopolitical conditions of today’s world economic order. The Agreement, which was concluded as part of and under the pressure of the GATT/WTO trade package, provides for internationally uniform standards of adequate protection of intellectual property in all States Members of the WTO, regardless of the differences of their economic development, industrial structures and social needs. As a global “deep trade agreement”, which governs not only cross border trade, but Members’ internal markets, it raises issues both of its compatibility with the principle of comparative advantage underlying international trade, and of the legitimacy of its interfering with domestic market regulation. The flexibilities, which have been built into the TRIPS Agreement, may mitigate concerns. However, the growing new bi- and pluri-lateralism of regional free trade agreements with their asymmetric intellectual property rules, the re-distribution of economic power among the developed and the emerging or rather the emerged countries, and the nature of strategic competition between globally acting multinational corporations have changed the rules of the game. The task ahead is to re-conceptualize the TRIPS Agreement as a framework regulation for national innovation markets, which at the same time are integrated into global markets to varying degrees. As such, it would form part of an open international economic law, which, in its turn, needs to be developed in order to overcome the rigid and already fading paradigms of international trade law. Only such a vision will help to accommodate intellectual property protection with the large diversity of industrial policies and with the many intellectual property-related public interests and policies, which WTO Members may or do adhere to.
Le contrôle juridictionnel limité de l’obtention et de la validité de la protection des variétés végétales par la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne ou les limites d’une autolimitation juridictionnelle en matière de propriété industrielle communautaire, in: Le droit économique entre intérêts privés et intérêt général - Hommage à Laurence Boy, Presses Universitaires d'Aix-Marseille, Aix-en-Provence 2016, 179 - 202.
- En vertu du règ. 2100/94 du Conseil du 27 juillet 1994 instituant un régime de protection communautaire des obtentions végétales, une variété végétale qui se distingue nettement de toute autre variété et dont l’existence est notoirement connue peut bénéficier de la protection par un droit d’exclusivité. Comme en droit des brevets d’invention, ce droit d’exclusivité est accordé par une autorité administrative, l’Office communautaire des variétés végétales, OCVV, après examen au fond de la conformité de la variété candidate aux conditions de protection, à savoir son caractère homogène, stable et distinct. Les décisions de l’OCVV accordant ou refusant le titre de protection sont sujettes à un contrôle par les chambres de recours de l’OCVV, et, sur appel, à un contrôle juridictionnel par la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne. Le tribunal de la Cour exercera un plein contrôle du bienfondé de la décision en fait et en droit, alors que la Cour ne reçoit que des appels en droit. Cependant, en ce qui concerne les questions à caractère scientifique ou technique complexe, le Tribunal, par une jurisprudence constante, accorde à l’OCVV (et à ses chambres de recours) une large marge d’appréciation discrétionnaire et limite son contrôle à l’examen de l’existence d’une erreur manifeste par l’OCVV ou ses chambres de recours. Cette jurisprudence, approuvée par la Cour, s’explique par une hésitation du Tribunal à substituer son appréciation à celle de l’OCVV, celui-ci ayant été établi en tant qu’autorité spéciale et experte. Pourtant, cette jurisprudence est critiquable à plusieurs égards. D’une part, elle n’est pas supportée par les précédents sur lesquels s’appuie le Tribunal. D’autre part, elle n’est pas conforme aux principes de protection de la propriété industrielle. Dans le système de protection des variétés végétales, comme dans tout le système de la propriété industrielle, la protection n’est pas accordée en tant que privilège, mais à titre de droit, tout comme son octroi ne peut être refusé qu’en vertu du droit. Il ne peut pas y avoir de place pour des décisions ou des appréciations discrétionnaires des conditions d’octroi dans un système de protection qui vise à offrir des droits d’exclusivité à des acteurs opérant sur des marchés concurrentiels. Pour un tel système, l’égalité des chances est essentielle. Par conséquent, l’appréciation par l’autorité administrative du caractère suffisamment méritoire ou non de l’objet à protéger doit être sujette à un contrôle juridictionnel complet.
- Under EU Regulation 2100/94 on Community Plant Variety Rights of 27 July 1994 plant varieties, which are distinct from existing, commonly known varieties, may enjoy protection by way of the grant of rights of exclusivity. Similar to patent protection, the exclusive right is granted by an administrative authority, the Community Plant Variety Office (CPVO), upon full examination of whether the candidate variety is stable, homogeneous, and clearly distinguishable from known reference varieties. The decision of the CPVO granting or refusing to grant protection is subject to review by the Boards of Appeal of the CPVO, and, upon appeal, to judicial review by the Court of Justice of the European Union. The General Court takes appeals on both points of fact and points of law; the Court takes only appeal in law from the decisions of the General Court. Under its established practice, as approved by the Court, the General Court, when examining the facts of a case, will exclude from review the assessment made by the CPVO (and/or its Boards of Appeal) of points of complex scientific nature, except if the assessment is affected by manifest error. The reason given for this limitation is that the Court may not substitute its own assessment to that of the administrative authority, which has been established as a special, expert agency. However, the Court’s practice is not based on pertinent precedent nor is it consistent with the principles of industrial property protection. The system of plant variety protection, just as the system of industrial property rights in general, rests on the concept that the title to protection is granted not as a privilege, but as a matter of right, just as it may be refused only as a matter of law. There is no room for discretion or for discretionary margins of appreciation regarding the conditions of protection in a system, which affords or refuses rights of exclusivity to the actors on competitive, i.e. equal opportunity markets. Therefore, under such a system, the administrative assessment of the sufficiency or insufficiency of merit of the subject matter submitted for protection may never be exempt from full judicial control.
- Also published as: Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Discussion Paper No. 4
Open Innovation, the Patent Exclusivity, and Knowhow Secrecy, in: Droit, Économie et Valeurs, Hommage à Bernard Remiche (Droit, Économie International), Editions Larcier, Bruxelles 2014, 293 - 321.
Mandatory Licensing Under Patent Law and Competition Law: Different Concerns, Complementary Roles, in: Reto M. Hilty, Kung-Chung Liu (
- The purpose of this chapter is limited to defining the differences of the functions and of the operation of compulsory licences, which typically are available under patent law, on one hand, or, on the other, are imposed as a matter of enforcing the antitrust laws. The thesis of this contribution is that each of patent law’s compulsory licensing rules does (and ought to) follow its own distinct rationale. Their common denominator is that they are specific to the systematic operation of patent protection as an incentive mechanism for innovation. By contrast, competition law constitutes part of the framework regulation of the market. Where its application results in imposing licensing obligations on patentees, it does so in order to correct an unjustified restriction of competition. This remedial function of antitrust-related licensing obligations is complementary to but different from patent law’s rules on compulsory licensing. The different functions of system-supportive or system-intrinsic mandatory licensing rules and competition-related obligations also mean that before introducing new or broadening existing provisions on compulsory licences a proper diagnosis has to be made of the ill that they are supposed to cure.
Mandatory Licensing Under Patent Law: European Concepts, in: Festschrift zu Ehren von Christian Kirchner - Recht im ökonomischen Kontext, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2014, 399 - 422.
Select from within the system: The European patent with unitary effect, in: Christophe Geiger (
Also published as : Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property and Competition Law Research Paper No. 12-11- Further to the failed efforts to create a European Union patent (ex Community patent), the European Union’s legislator currently prepares the introduction of a "European patent with unitary effect" as a matter of enhanced cooperation among a majority of EU Member States. The paper analyses this ambiguous form of a unitary patent as part of the broader system of patent protection in Europe. More particularly, the concern of the paper is with the increasing complexity of the Union’s multi-level system of patent protection, which will result from the co-existence and optional availability of purely national patents, of a territorially selective bundle of national patents granted by the European Patent Organization, and of the European patent with a territorially unitary effect. This complexity will be exacerbated, first, by the different multi-layer structures of the European patent proper and of the unitary patent respectively, and, second, by the ambiguous legal nature of the unitary patent (in part union law, in part national law, in part international law). In addition, both the European patent proper, as up-graded by an international "Agreement on a Unified Patent Court", and, more particularly, the unitary patent are characterized by systemic imbalances, and affected by serious doubts about their compatibility with European Union law. For all these reasons, the paper concludes that, instead of establishing a highly complex and asymmetric system of patents on unsafe legal ground, an entirely fresh approach to EU-wide patent protection is necessary. This would be all the more opportune as the European patent with unitary effect neither represents a real effort of advanced integration nor addresses any of the pressing issues of modernization of patent protection.
- Available at SSRN
- Event: Colloque organisé par le CEIPI, Strasbourg, 2012-04-26
The Property Aspects of the European Patent with Unitary Effect: A National Perspective for a European Prospect?, in: Scrutinizing Internal and External Dimensions of European Law - Les dimensions internes et externes du droit européen à l'épreuve - Liber Amicorum Paul Demaret - Volume 1 (College of Europe Studies / Cahiers du College, 17), Peter Lang, Bruxelles, Bern, Berlin, Frankfurt am Main, New York, Oxford, Wien 2013, 481 - 498.
Also published as : Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property and Competition Law Research Paper ; No. 13-17- The exploitation of patents as an asset, which may be traded by way of assignment, licensing or as security, has become increasingly important. In this regard, Art. 7 of the new EU Regulation No. 1257/2012 of 17 December 2012 on unitary patent protection provides that, as an object of property, a European patent with unitary effect shall be treated in its entirety and in all participating Member States as a national patent of the participating Member State in which that patent has unitary effect and in which the applicant had her/his residence or principal place of business or, by default, had a place of business on the date of filing the application for the European patent. In case the applicant had no such form of domicile in a participating Member State, German law applies (Art. 7 (3)). The result of Art. 7 is that, whereas unitary patents held by owners having some domicile in participating Member States typically will be subject to the national law of the patentee, firms from non-participating Member States, which do not have some form of domicile within the territory of enhanced cooperation, will never have their national law applied to unitary patents covering their inventive achievements. The author submits that Art. 7 is in conflict with both the purpose of the creation of unitary patent protection and with primary EU law.
- http://ssrn.com/abstract=2347921
Strategic patenting by pharmaceutical industry - towards a concept of abusive practices of protection, in: Josef Drexl, Na Ri Lee (
Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht im Gemeinsamen Markt, in: Ullrich Immenga, Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker (
Intellectual Property: Exclusive Rights for a Purpose, in: Problemy Polskiego e Europejskiego Prawa Prywatnego: Ksiega Pamiatkowa Profesora Mariana Kępińskiego, LEX, Warszawa 2012, 425 - 459.
Also published as : Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property & Competition Law Research Paper No. 13-01- Protection of innovative technologies by patents or by copyrights is marked by a tension between, on the one hand, the private interest in obtaining a broad exclusivity over market opportunities, and, on the other, the public interest in strictly limiting the "monopoly" right to what is necessary for it to serve as an incentive for innovation. Frequently the argument goes that instances of "over-protection" may be remedied by – possibly enhanced – enforcement of competition law. However, while intellectual property protection forms part of the framework regulation of competition driven dynamic markets, competition law alone will not contain excessive protection but at the margin. A dysfunctional operation of the system of protection typically results from a mismatch between the purpose, which it is supposed to serve, and the way in which the property rights are interpreted and/or used, which are made available to market actors to meet such purpose. There is, therefore, a need to adequately bind the property logic, which informs the system of protection in practice, to its underlying policy. Binding the protection of exclusive rights over technology to its purpose is warranted, because innovative knowledge is not a subject matter of property rights like any other. Rather, it is transformed from a public good into a private right of property by specific legislative design. Whether bound tightly or loosely to its purpose, whether defined broadly or narrowly, there is thus a political content to the protection of technological property. It so is even if the legislator or the courts decide to put the emphasis on the property logic rather than on the purpose of protection. The nature and intensity of this political content necessarily varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction as, indeed, it will and must be defined in accordance with the needs of an economy and the goals of a polity. For the European Union this means that to the extent it sets for itself the objectives of technological property protection, it also ought to determine itself the terms of the system and to control itself its operation. After all, the conditions and criteria of technology protection constitute part of the framework regulation of the Internal Market as a market for innovation.
- Available at SSRN
Harmonizing Patent Law: The Untameable Union Patent, in: Harmonisation of European IP law: from European rules to Belgian law and practice - contributions in honour of Frank Gotzen (Centrum voor Intellectuele Rechten, 23), Bruylant/Larcier, Brussels 2012, 243 - 294.
Also published as : Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property & Competition Law Research Paper No. 12-03- To the difference of trademarks and designs, protection of patents in Europe essentially rests on national law only. The 'European patent' as granted by the European Patent Organization through the European Patent Office, while internationally uniform as to the conditions of the grant, represents but a 'bundle' of as many independent national patents as have been asked for by the applicant. As a consequence, the terms of the exclusive right, which they confer upon their owner, are determined by the various national laws. It is to remedy this territorially fragmented and more or less diverse protection, that since about half a century the European Union attempts to establish an autonomous system of unitary patent protection of its own design, but has failed to achieve it whichever way it chose. The stumbling blocks have been not so much the proper determination of the substance of protection, since only little efforts of modernization have been undertaken. Rather, they were the choice of the language regime for the patents granted, and the establishment of a common patent litigation system. Both obstacles have a history of their own. While the latter is still evolving, the former actually has blocked the introduction of an EU-wide unitary European Union (ex Community) patent. Instead, a 'European patent with unitary effect' is about to come, which will cover only the territories of those EU Member States, which will participate in 'enhanced cooperation' within the Union, most likely a majority of 25 States. Switching from the entire Union to enhanced cooperation was, indeed, the not unwelcome opportunity not only to overcome the language hurdle, but also to modify the very structure of patent protection, and to try to move from a Union type of patent to an international one. The paper is concerned with, first, why the language regime could become or could be made a reason to move from a Union project to one of enhanced cooperation among “the willing”; second, with whether enhanced cooperation is a proper approach at all under Union law; third, with the problematic structure and nature of the 'European patent with unitary effect'; and fourth, with the no less problematic co-existence of an up-graded European patent as it will result from the eventual adoption of an 'Agreement on a Unified Patent Court' to be concluded among EU Member States only. The conclusion is that instead of obtaining a workable system of patent protection in Europe, we will have to face a multi-layer monster system of patents of all kinds, national, full and half European, Unionist, territorially fragmented or unitary, balanced or unbalanced in their substance.
- Available at SSRN
Die Entwicklung eines Systems des gewerblichen Rechtsschutzes in der Europäischen Union: Die Rolle des Gerichts, in: Peter Behrens, Thomas Eger, Hans-Bernd Schäfer (
Also published as : Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition & Tax Law Research Paper No. 10-11 unter dem Titel: The Development of a System of Industrial Property Protection in the European Union: The Role of the Court of Justice- The Court of Justice of the European Union has frequently been criticized for its allegedly pro-integration and almost pro-active judicial policy regarding the construction and the application of primary and secondary Union law. This paper aims at showing that, at least with respect to the development of a uniform case law on harmonized national and unified Community industrial property, the Court has had and still has to fulfil its unique task of informing national courts and the industrial property community in general as to the direction, in which European Union law is to evolve in the interest of the Union’s legal unity and of its independent industrial property policy. To this effect, a comparison is made between, on the one hand, the system of decentralized judicial review as it has been established with respect to both harmonized national copyright, trademark and design law, and unitary Community trademarks, designs and plant varieties, with, on the other hand, the recent proposals made for the conclusion of a “European Patent Litigation Agreement (EPLA)” and for the creation by international agreement of a highly centralized “European and European Union Patent Court (EEUPC)”. Both concern the settlement of litigation over infringement and validity of patents, the former relating only to national patents resulting from the bundle of patents granted by the European Patent Office at uniform conditions, the latter to both these patents and the unitary European Union patent (formerly the Community patent) as expected to be introduced by a Community regulation. More particularly, the paper critically assesses the relationship between the proposed inter-national EEUPC and the European Court of Justice. The draft agreement as currently under consideration by the Council of the European Union pretends at creating a workable link between the two different courts with a view to ensuring primacy of the Union’s law and uniformity of the application of its secondary law on patents. However, in reality the proposal tends to both severely reduce the role, which the European Court of Justice ought to play in the Union’s legal order, and to restrict the sovereign development of a forward looking, independent patent policy by the Union. This is so because, on the one hand, as a specialised and centralised high court, the EEUPC will by itself and by its very vocation ensure the development of a patent-specific “expert” case law and of its uniformity, and, on the other, because the inclusion of both the European and the European Union patent into one litigation agreement containing a full set of rules on the infringement and on the revocation of patents will exclude any unilaterally defined patent policy. As a result, patent law is vowed to develop in splendid isolation, and without the benefit of the guidance, which the European Court of Justice, it being a supreme court of general jurisdiction, has given and is called upon to give in other areas of the protection of industrial and intellectual property in the Union.
- Available at SSRN
- Event: XII. Travemünder Symposium zur Ökonomischen Analyse des Rechts, Travemünde, 2010-03-24
Abschnitt VII. Immaterialgüterrecht, Teil B: Die Anwendung der Wettbewerbsregeln auf die Verwertung von Schutzrechten und sonst geschützten Kenntnissen, in: Ulrich Immenga, Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker (
Abschnitt VII. Immaterialgüterrecht, Teil A: Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht im Binnenmarkt, in: Ulrich Immenga, Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker (
The Court of Justice of the European Union - The Future European and EU Patents Court: Hierarchy, Complementarity, Rivalry?, in: Patent Practice in Japan and Europe - Liber Amicorum Guntram Rahn, Kluwer Law International, Alphen aan den Rijn 2011, 81 - 91.
Patente und technische Normen: Konflikt und Komplementarität in patent- und wettbewerbsrechtlicher Sicht, in: Matthias Leistner (
Les pratiques de prise de brevets de l’industrie pharmaceutique, in: Clotilde Jourdin-Fortier, Isabelle Moine-Dupuis (
Die Beteiligung Dritter im Verfahren der Schutzrechtserteilung - Sonderling Sortenschutz, in: Schutz von Kreativität und Wettbewerb - Festschrift für Ullrich Loewenheim zum 75. Geburtstag, C.H. Beck, München 2009, 333 - 350.
Gene Patents and Clearing Models. Some Comments from a Competition Law Perspective, in: Geertrui Van Overwalle (
European Competition Law, Community-wide Exhaustion and Compulsory Licenses - Disintegrationg the Internal Market in the Public Interest, in: Christine Godt (
L’ordre concurrentiel dans la pensée juridique, in: Walid Abdelgawad (
La sécurite juridique en droit économique allemand: observations d'un privatiste, in: Laurence Boy, Jean-Baptiste Racine, Fabrice Siiriainen (
Patent Pools – Policy and Problems, in: Josef Drexl (
Le droit de la concurrence, propriété intellectuelle, et l’accès à l’information, in: Mireille Buydens, Séverine Dusollier (
- Event: L' intérêt général et l'accès à l'information en propriété intellectuelle, 2006-04-21
National, European and Community Patent Protection - Time for Reconsideration, in: Ansgar Ohly, Diethelm Klippel (
Also published as : EUI Working Papers, Law No. 2006/41- http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/6421/LAW-%202006-41.pdf
The Interaction between Competition Law and Intellectual Property Law - An Overview, in: Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, E. Atanasiu (
- Auch veröffentlicht in: Patent Pools - Approaching an Intellectual Property Problem via Competition Policy 2007, 305 - 328.
- Auch veröffentlicht in: 10th European Competition Law Annual 2007 - A Reformed Approach to Article 82 EC, XXVII - LXXV
Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht im Gemeinsamen Markt, in: Ullrich Immenga, Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker (
Traditional Knowledge, Biodiversity, Benefit-Sharing, and the Patent System: Romantics vs. Economics?, in: Francesco Francioni, Tullio Scovazzi (
Harmony and unity of European intellectual property protection, in: Intellectual Property in the New Millennium - Essays in Honour of William R. Cornish, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2004, 20 - 46.
Die gemeinschaftsrechtliche Entwicklung des Rechts Geistigen Eigentums, in: Peter Behrens (
- Event: Wissenschaftliches Symposium im Europa-Kolleg, Hamburg
Patentgemeinschaften, in: Wirtschafts- und Privatrecht im Spannungsfeld von Privatautonomie, Wettbewerb und Regulierung - Festschrift für Ulrich Immenga zum 70. Geburtstag, Beck, München 2004, 403 - 431.
Protecting Technology - Property or Policy, in: Ove Granstrand (
- Event: The Swedish International Symposium on Economics, Law and Intellectual Property
Competitor Cooperation and the Evolution of Competition Law: Issues for Research in a Perspective of Globalization, in: Josef Drexl (
L'ordre concurrentiel - Rapport de synthèse ou: Variations sur un thème de Nice, in: L' ordre concurrentiel - mélanges en l'honneur d'Antoine Pirovano, Frison-Roche, Paris 2003, 507 - 530.
Competition, Intellectual Property Rights and Transfer of Technology - Issues for Further Discussion in View of UNCTAD X, in: Surendra J. Patel, Pedro Roffe, Abdulqawi Yusuf (
Intellectual Property, Access to Information and Antitrust: Harmony, Disharmony and International Harmonization, in: Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Diane L. Zimmerman, Harry First (
Technologieschutz zwischen Wettbewerbs- und Industriepolitik, in: Gerhard Schricker, Thomas Dreier, Annette Kur (
Zum Verhältnis von Sektorenregulierung, Wettbewerbsaufsicht, Technologieschutz und Innovation der Telekommunikation: Falsch gewählt oder falsch verbunden?, in: Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem (
Die gemeinschaftsrechtliche Gestaltung des Wettbewerbsrechts und des Rechts des geistigen Eigentums, in: Peter-Christian Müller-Graff (
International Exhaustion of Intellectual Property Rights: Lessons From European Economic Integration, in: Mélanges en hommage à Michel Waelbroeck (Etudes de droit européen et international), Bruylant, Bruxelles 1999, 205 - 254.
Antitrust Law Relating to High Technology Industries - A Case for or Against International Rules?, in: Roger Zäch (
- Event: Seminar, Zurich, 1999-07-08
International Harmonisation of Competition Law - Making Diversity a Workable Concept, in: Hanns Ullrich (
- Event: Workshop, Bruges, 1997-07-03
Kartellrechtliche Aspekte des Informationszugangs, in: Michael Bartsch, Bernd Lutterbeck (
Zum Erfolgsrisiko beim Forschungs- und Entwicklungsvertrag, in: Festschrift für Wolfgang Fikentscher zum 70. Geburtstag, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 1998, 298 - 328.
Regional and Multilateral Trade Rules: Selected Issues, Comment on Intellectual Property Rights, in: Paul Demaret, Jean-Francois Bellis, Gonzalo Garcia Jimenez (
Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht, Gemeinsame Forschung und Entwicklung, in: Ulrich Immenga, Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker (
Wissenschaftlich-technische Kreativität zwischen privatem Eigentum, freiem Wettbewerb und öffentlicher Steuerung, in: Najib Harabi (
- Event: Interdisziplinäre Vortragsreihe der Eidgenössischen Technischen Hochschule Zürich und der Universität Zürich Sommersemester 1995, Zürich
Technology Protection According to TRIPS - Principles and Problems, in: Friedrich-Karl Beier, Gerhard Schricker (
Kapitel 4: Kartellrecht, in: Hanns Ullrich, Eberhard Körner (
Kapitel 1: Softwareschutz, in: Hanns Ullrich, Eberhard Körner (
Rules on Ownership and Allocation of Intellectual Property in Rand D Collaboration Between Science and Industry: Some Principles and Comparisons, in: Max Planck Society (
- Event: European Research Structures - Changes and Challenges - Mobility of Researchers in the European Union, Ringberg castle, Tegernsee
Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz, in: Manfred A. Dauses (
Die Forschungs- und Technologiepolitik der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, in: Manfred A. Dauses (
Europäische Forschungs- und Technologiepolitik und die Ordnung des Wettbewerbs im Gemeinsamen Markt, in: Karl-Ernst Schenk (
Wissenschaftstransfer und Urheberrecht, in: Herrmann Joseph Schuster (
Geschäftsrisiko und Unternehmenskooperation, in: Festschrift für Ernst Steindorff zum 70. Geburtstag am 13. März 1990, de Gruyter, Berlin 1990, 281 - 302.
GATT: Industrial Property Protection, Fair Trade and Development, in: Friedrich-Karl Beier, Gerhard Schricker (
Die Funktionsbindung des öffentlichen Rundfunks und der Kontrollanspruch des Kartellrechts, in: Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem (
Ausstattungsschutz im Gemeinsamen Markt, in: Gerhard Schricker, Dieter Stauder (
Verbraucherschutz, in: Management Enzyklopädie, Bd. 9: Tagungen - Vorstand, 2.
Gemeinschaftsrechtliche Erschöpfung von Immaterialgüterrechten und europäischer Konzernverbund, in: Festschrift für Eugen Ulmer = Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht Internationaler Teil 1983, Nr. 6 - 7, VCH, Weinheim 1983, 370 - 378.
Der Europäische Gerichtshof, in: Management Enzyklopädie, Bd. 3: Eigenfertigung und Fremdbezug - Fusionen, 2.
Unternehmenskooperation bei Forschungsaufträgen der öffentlichen Hand, in: Karl-Matthias Meessen (
Intellectual Property in the EEC, in: Competition Law in Western Europe and the USA, Kluwer, Deventer 1978.
Der Grundsatz des freien Warenverkehrs und die Durchsetzbarkeit nationaler Warenzeichen, in: Österreichisches Zentrum für Wirtschaftlichkeit und Produktivität (
Zivilprozeß und Kartellverstoß, in: Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz, Urheberrecht, Wirtschaftsrecht - Mitarbeiterfestschrift zum 70. Geburtstag von Eugen Ulmer, mit Beiträgen aus dem deutschen, ausländischen und internationalen Recht, Heymanns, Köln 1973, 521 - 534.
Journal Articles
The Unified Patent Court, Yearbook of European Law 2023, 1 - 34, 11.11.2023. DOI
Patent Dependency under European and European Union Patent Law – A Regulatory Gap, GRUR Int 72, 12 (2023), 1107 - 1124. DOI
- Technological progress generally is not disruptive but sequential. Innovations build on prior innovations, typically by presenting improvements or complements. Under patent law, such follow-on innovation meets with an obstacle if the use of the invention underlying it infringes a prior patent, and if, for one reason or another, the owner of that prior patent prefers, as it may, to refuse granting a license. It is only in case the follow-on (or ‘second’) invention involves an important technical advance of considerable economic significance in relation to the invention claimed in the prior (or ‘first’) patent that in Europe, in accordance with Art. 31 TRIPS, national patent laws provide for a right of the owner of the second patent to obtain, by way of a decision of the patent office or of a court, a dependency license. By contrast, the EU’s system of unitary patent protection does not provide for a dependency licensing regime. Instead, Regulation 1257/2021 on the European patent with unitary effect refers the matter to national law. This means that despite the importance of its invention the owner of a dependent patent will never obtain a mandatory license covering the Internal Market but only territorially limited national licenses for which it must apply separately in each Member State, go through multiple different procedures and comply with different national requirements. The absurdity of such hindering of follow-on innovation in the Internal Market by regulatory abstention is no less as regards national patents that the European Patent Office grants as a bundle in the form of the European patent and that are now additionally held together by the uniform infringement rules of the Unified Patent Court Agreement. After all, that category of a European patent is supposed to represent an equivalent alternative to the unitary patent and, therefore, ought to meet the same Internal Market requirements. Therefore, this study proposes to harmonize Member States’ dependency licensing regimes and to complement the system of unitary patent protection accordingly. To this end, it presents the common principles of national regimes, analyzes the particular need for and characteristics of modern mandatory licensing rules and discusses the deficits of alternative approaches that might be available under EU competition law. A particular emphasis is put on distinguishing dependency licensing from compulsory licensing in the public interest, and on the functional complementarity existing between incentivizing inventions by patent protection and stimulating follow-on innovation by mandatory licensing regimes.
Private Enforcement of the EU Rules on Competition – Nullity Neglected, IIC 52, 5 (2021), 606 - 635.
- Private enforcement of the European Union’s rules on competition (Arts. 101, 102 TFEU) has become prominent as a counterpart to their public enforcement. Mostly, it is identified with tort actions brought under EU-harmonized national law by individuals claiming compensation for the harm suffered from anticompetitive agreements or practices. However, claims for compensation represent imperfect sanctions for the infringement of the competition rules because they are brought only once the damage is done and at a time when the conditions of competition may have changed. Typically also, such private actions are no equivalent or complement to administrative enforcement, but are largely dependent on it (follow-on actions). In addition, bringing them is attractive only if the damage suffered is considerable, sufficient evidence available, and the defendant solvent enough. Therefore, this paper revisits the first line of private enforcement, which is enforcing the nullity of anticompetitive agreements as provided for directly by primary Union law in Art. 101(2) TFEU. Nullity was a much-discussed issue under the authorization regime of Reg. 17/62, the first regulation implementing the enforcement of the competition rules, but has become somewhat neglected as a sanction since Reg. 1/2003 changed the enforcement system. Yet, it is precisely under the regime of immediate and direct applicability of both Arts. 101(1) and 101(3) TFEU, which Reg. 1/2003 reestablished, that the potential of nullity as a sanction of anticompetitive agreements could be fully activated. Such active use of invalidity challenges may lead to redefining the interface between EU law and national contract law, which is the line of severability of the innocent parts of a restrictive agreement from its anti-competitive parts. It should also result in reassessing the legal fate of follow-on transactions concluded by a party to an anticompetitive agreement with third parties, and it should bring abusive contracts within the realm of the nullity sanction that dominant firms impose on third parties. The guiding principle for such general reappraisal of the nullity sanction must be to bring its purpose fully to bear, which is to facilitate exit from anticompetitive agreements or from (abusive) contract clauses with a view to reopening competition and/or to allow the renegotiating of a transaction in terms of undistorted competition. This may mean that only the party whose freedom of competition is restricted may claim nullity.
BVerfG contra EuGH: Der PSPP-Konflikt, Europäisches Wirtschafts- und Steuerrecht 6 (2020), 301 - 323.
Le système de protection du brevet unitaire de l’Union après le Brexit: désuni, mais unifié?, Propriétés intellectuelles 64 (2017), 27 - 38.
The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP): Extending Trade Policy to Domestic Markets, Revue internationale de droit économique 2016, 4 (2016), 421 - 453.
- While, due to the outcome of the presidential elections in the United States, the negotiations of an Agreement on a “Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)” between the European Union and the United States have been suspended sine die, the general political discussion and more particularly academic inquiry into the fundamental economic and legal issues TTIP raises will and must go on. The EU’s commercial policy continues to rely on bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) as a pillar of its international trade relations. The main feature of these new generation or “deep trade” agreements is that, in addition to the virtually complete elimination of customs tariffs and the reinforcement of trade facilitation measures at state borders, they institutionalize, intensify and expand regulatory cooperation between the parties as a way of reducing the trade restricting operation and effects of non-tariff, border-unspecific “technical barriers to trade” (TBT) in goods and services. Typically, they also complement such FTAs by an agreement on standards regarding the protection of matters of public policy, such as the protection of consumers or of the environment. As indicated by the name of the Canada – EU “Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement” (CETA), these FTAs thus become “comprehensive” in that they extend “behind the borders” and embrace the parties’ domestic market regulations, meaning that they aim at making the regulation of the parties’ internal markets “compatible” with a view to facilitating international trade or even at integrating these markets into a “deep integration” free trade area. The reason for examining the legal issues that these new generation of free trade agreements raise by taking TTIP as an illustration is, that if concluded and put into operation as proposed by the EU, it would represent both the most advanced example of such FTAs and the first to have been agreed upon by economically equal and internationally competing “partners”. Therefore, it may be assumed that TTIP will be a model FTA functioning effectively, symmetrically and dynamically not only to the reciprocal advantage of the parties, but as a free trade area integrating the domestic markets concerned under the joint control by the parties. It is precisely this “deep integration” effect and the concomitant loss of sovereign and independent regulatory control by each party over the development of its domestic market and of democratic self-determination of the exercise of such autonomous control that triggered the broad public discussion of the political and legal desirability of TTIP or CETA and the likes. However, the paper is not, at least not directly, concerned with the controversial issues of constitutional law and public policy underlying that general discussion. Rather, its focus is on understanding the preliminary question of what really constitutes the deep trade or integration character of an FTA. To this effect, the paper examines the mechanism and reach of regulatory cooperation, the tension existing between the reciprocity principle of trade agreements and the collaborative nature of regulatory cooperation, including the latter’s complementary rules on the protection of public interests, and, given the indivisibility of external and internal trade, the inherent conflict between a state’s sovereignty as regards the independent choice and the terms of its regulatory control over its domestic market on the one hand, and, on the other, the extension of an FTA’s regime to that domestic market regulation. Ultimately, by promoting deep trade FTAs and by multiplying them, a party’s commercial policy may come not only to pre-determine, but to dominate the definition of its domestic market regulation. Thus, as regards the EU, its commercial policy powers may tend to become themselves transformed into internal policy powers. In addition, the EU might become the victim of its own commercial strategy as it will increasingly be bound itself by the regime to which it binds its trade partners. Therefore, the adjournment of the TTIP project should not be seen as a loss of precious time, but as providing a period of reflection on the goals, terms and limits of the EU’s commercial policy regarding comprehensive free trade agreements.
- Also published at SSRN as Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No. 17-01
The European Patent and Its Courts: An Uncertain Prospect and an Unfinished Agenda, IIC 46, 1 (2015), 1 - 9. DOI
Le futur système de protection des inventions par brevets dans l'Union européenne: un exemple d'intégration (re-)poussée?, Propriétés intellectuelles 53 (2014), 382 - 385.
Also published as : Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition Discussion Paper No. 2- Le 17 décembre 2012 le Parlement européen et le Conseil ont adopté le règlement no. 1257/2012 « mettant en œuvre la coopération renforcée dans le domaine de la création d’une protection unitaire conférée par un brevet » et le règlement no. 1260/2012 concernant « les modalités applicables en matière de traduction ». Ces deux règlements et l’ »Accord relatif à une juridiction unifiée du brevet » (JUB), signé le 19 février 2013 par 25 États membres, introduisent un nouveau système de protection des inventions par brevets dans l’Union européenne. Ceci vise à combler la lacune laissée par l’échec de la création d’un brevet communautaire. Toutefois, les controverses politiques et juridiques, dont les négociations du « paquet du brevet unitaire »avaient été entourées, n’ont pas disparu entièrement. Le règlement sur le brevet unitaire n’entrera pas en application aussi longtemps que l’Accord JUB n’a pas été ratifié par un nombre suffisant d’États membres (13, y inclus l’Allemagne, la France et le Royaume Uni). L’Espagne a saisi la Cour de Justice de deux actions en nullité concernant respectivement le règlement no. 1257/2012 et le règlement no. 1260/2012 (affaires C-146/2013 et C-147/2013). La coexistence de deux catégories de brevets européens similaires, mais distincts – le brevet européen unitaire et le brevet européen uniforme -, qui tous les deux ont une structure à niveaux multiples, et le fait que les États membres participant à la coopération renforcée et les États membres adhérant à l’Accord JUB ne sont pas nécessairement les mêmes, ainsi que la possibilité de déclarer l’opt out de l’Accord JUB (et le re-opt in), font que , dans son ensemble, le système de protection est d’une complexité presqu’impénétrable. L’une des complications les plus troublantes et une des raisons des multiples incertitudes juridiques concerne les rapports entre la Cour de Justice de l’Union européenne et la juridiction unifiée du brevet, dont la compétence en matière de nullité et de contrefaçon s’étendra au brevet européen unitaire et également au brevet européen uniforme. Les incertitudes concernant les rapports entre les deux juridictions existent malgré (ou plutôt à cause de) la volonté du législateur de l’Union d’immuniser le brevet unitaire totalement contre l’interprétation de ses règles par la Cour de Justice. L’analyse du nouveau système de protection vise à vérifier sa fonctionnalité, ses avantages et déficits ainsi qu’à déterminer sa place propre dans l’ordre juridique de l’Union. Elle arrive à la conclusion que, tout en poussant la protection des inventions par brevet au bord, sinon en dehors de l’ordre juridique de l’Union, le nouveau système contribue à peine « à renforcer le processus d’intégration » par la voie d’une coopération renforcée (art. 20 (1, sous-para. 2) TUE). La préoccupation du législateur du « paquet du brevet unitaire » est de faciliter l’obtention et la mise en œuvre effective d’une protection territorialement élargie plutôt que d’assurer le bon fonctionnement du système entier. Cependant, en tant que système d’incitation à la recherche-développement technologique, la protection des inventions par brevets doit être accessible et abordable pour tous, faciliter les transactions de technologies, et établir une régulation-cadre équilibrée des marchés d’innovation à concurrence libre.
- On 17 December 2012, the European Parliament and the Council enacted Regulation (EU) No.1257/2012 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary patent protection, and Regulation (EU) No. 1260/2012 regarding the “applicable translation arrangements”. Together with the “Agreement on a Unified Patent Court”, which 25 EU Member States signed on 19 February 2013, a new system of patent protection in the European Union has thus been established. Its purpose is to bridge the gap left by the failure of the Union to provide itself with a Union patent matching the existing protection of Community Trade Marks, Community Designs and Community Plant Variety Rights. The political and legal controversies surrounding the making of this “Unitary Patent Package” have not come to an end yet. The unitary patent will not become available before a sufficient number of Member States (13, including France, Germany and the UK) have ratified the Agreement on the Unified Patent Court. Spain has brought two actions challenging before the Court of Justice the validity of Reg. 1257/2012 and Reg. 1260/2012 (cases C-146/2013 and C-147/13). Due to the co-existence of the new unitary patent with an up-graded traditional European patent, which both are of a similar, yet different multi-layer structure, and due also to the fact that participation of Member States in enhanced cooperation and adherence to the Unified Court Agreement differ, and further due to the possibility to opt out from the jurisdiction of the Unified patent Court (and to re-opt in), the new system of patent protection in the EU is of an almost impenetrable complexity. One of the more troubling complications and legal uncertainties concerns the relationship between the European Court of Justice and the Unified Patent Court, which will have exclusive jurisdiction over both the unitary European patent and the uniform European patent. This relationship remains unclear despite (or because) of the legislator’s efforts, to immunize the unitary patent against an interpretation of its rules by the European Court of Justice. The paper examines afresh the new patent system with a view to determine its workability and advantages, its deficits and its proper fitting into the Union’s legal order. The overall conclusion is that, while moving European patent protection to the margin, if not outside the Union’s legal order, it contributes little to ”reinforcing integration” by way of enhanced cooperation (Art. 20(1, subpar. 2) TEU). The focus of the Unitary Patent Package mainly is on the grant and the enforcement of patent protection rather than on its overall well-functioning as an all open system providing incentives for investment in research and development, a basis for property supported technology transactions, and a balanced framework regulation for free markets for innovation.
- Available at SSRN
Declaration on Patent Protection, IIC 45, 6 (2014), 679 - 698 (
- Auch veröffentlicht in: Intellectual Property Law and Policy Journal, 2014, Vol. 45, 1 - 32 (in Japanese)
- As a framework regulation for innovation markets, the patent system needs to be tailored to the innovation process, which it is supposed to serve, and to the competitive environment, within which it must operate. In order to ensure an efficient functionality of the patent system as an innovation policy tool, patent rights ought to be defined, justified and continually reconsidered by reference to their socio-economic benefits and costs.
Sovereign states should retain the discretion to adopt a patent system that best suits their technological capabilities as well as their social, cultural and economic needs and priorities, with the proviso that the exercise of such discretion must remain within the boundaries of international law. Taking into account the customary principles of interpretation of international law, this Declaration seeks to shed light on these boundaries. The purpose is to clarify the policy space that the ‘Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights’ (TRIPS Agreement) leaves to national legislators and judicial authorities with regard to the implementation and administration of their patent systems.
When the world’s major patent systems first developed into their present form, nation states were able to engage in the regulatory design process under conditions of high sovereign autonomy. Over the past decades, this autonomy has been progressively eroded. Today, states face a legal and institutional regime consisting of multilateral, regional and bilateral agreements, which are becoming increasingly complex and set more and more limits to their regulatory freedom.
As a result, the ability of states to maintain a proper balance between the need for protection of knowledge goods in global markets, the freedom to regulate national or regional innovation markets, and the policy space for pursuing diverse public interest goals risks becoming unduly constrained. This Declaration seeks to clarify some of the regulatory options states still retain under international law, in particular the TRIPS Agreement. - Auch veröffentlicht als Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No. 14-19
- http://bit.ly/2kIgLUI
Enhanced Cooperation in the Area of Unitary Patent Protection and European Integration, ERA-Forum 14, 4 (2013), 589 - 610. DOI
- Auch veröffentlicht in: Riv. dir. ind. 2013, 325 – 351
- The Court of Justice is expected to decide soon on the validity of the Council decision of March 2011 authorising enhanced cooperation in the area of unitary patent protection. Should the Court invalidate the decision, the decisions of the Parliament and of the Council of last December, which implement enhanced cooperation by the means of two regulations introducing a European patent with unitary effect and providing for a specific language regime will lack a legal basis. The paper examines the new legal issues arising with regard to the authorisation and the implementation of enhanced cooperation. It concludes that, in a long term perspective, repealing the Council’s decision will best serve maintaining the legitimacy both of reinforced integration through enhanced cooperation within the European Union and of regulating dynamic competition within the Internal Market by unified patent protection.
Patents and Standards - A Comment on the German Federal Supreme Court Decision Orange Book Standard, IIC 41, 3 (2010), 337 - 351.
Comments of the Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law on the 2009 Commission Proposal for the Establishment of a Unified European Patent Judiciary, IIC 40, 7 (2009), 817 - 838 (
Propriété intellectuelle, concurrence et regulation - Limites de protection et limites de contrôle, Revue internationale de droit économique 32, 4 (2009), 399 - 450.
Technologietransfer und Kartellrecht: Der Bedeutungsverlust der EU-Gruppenfreistellungsverordnung, Rundbrief / VPP Deutscher Verband der Patentingenieure und Patentassessoren e.V. 2 (2007), 51 - 64.
Patente, Wettbewerb und technische Normen: Rechts- und ordnungspolitische Fragestellungen, GRUR 109, 10 (2007), 817 - 830.
Expansionist Intellectual Property Protection and Reductionist Competition Rules - A TRIPS Perspective, Journal of international economic law 7, 2 (2004), 401 - 430.
- Auch veröffentlicht in: K. Maskus, J. Reichman (eds.): International Public Goods and Transfer of Technology Under a Globalized Intellectual Property Regime, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2005, S. 401 - 430
IP-Antitrust in Context - Approaches to International Rules on Restrictive Uses of of Intellectual Property rights, The Antitrust bulletin 48, 4 (2003), 837 - 883.
La mondialisation du droit économique: vers un nouvel ordre public économique - Rapport introductif, Revue internationale de droit économique 3/4 (2003), 291 - 311.
Mondialisation du droit économique, Revue internationale de droit économique 2/3 (2002), 171 - 565.
Des échanges internationaux à la globalisation de la production et la concurrence des systèmes, Revue internationale de droit économique 2-3 (2002), 206 - 213.
Patent Protection in Europe: Integrating Europe into the Community or the Community into Europe?, European law journal 8, 4 (2002), 433 - 491.
Dienstleistungskonzessionen und europäisches Vergaberecht, ZVgR: Zeitschrift für deutsches und internationales Vergaberecht 2000, 85 - 97.
Lizenzverträge im europäischen Kartellrecht - Einordnung und Einzelfragen, Mitteilungen der deutschen Patentanwälte 89 (1998), 50 - 60.
Chairman's Report, Mehr Initiative, mehr Innovation: Innovationsstärkende Regelung der Ergebnisverwertung öffentlich geförderter Forschung und Entwicklung, Empfehlungen des Sachverständigenkreises des Bundesministers für Bildung, Wissenschaft, Forschung und Technologie. Part reprinted, Mitteilungen der deutschen Patentanwälte 88 (1997), 80 - 86.
- Part reprinted in Wissenschaftsmanagement 3,1997, S. 259-264
La magistrature économique à l’intersection des réalités économiques et des règles juridiques: un état des lieux, Revue internationale de droit économique 11 (1997), 143 - 146.
Harmonisation within the European Union, European competition law review 18 (1997), 178 - 184.
Lizenzkartellrecht auf dem Weg zur Mitte, GRUR Int 45, 4 (1996), 555 - 568.
TRIPS: Adequate Protection, Inadequate Trade, Adequate Competition Policy, Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal 4, 1 (1995), 153 - 210.
- Auch veröffentlicht in: John Owen Haley, Hiroshi Iyori (eds.), Antitrust - A New International Trade Remedy?, Pacific Rim Law & Policy Association, Seattle 1995, 153 - 210.
Auslegung und Ergänzung der Schutzrechtsregeln gemeinsamer Forschung und Entwicklung, GRUR 93, 3 (1993), 338 - 344.
Patents and Know how, Free Trade, Inter-Enterprise Cooperation and Competition Within the Internal Market, Tokkyo-kanri 1992, 5-18 - 133-150.
- Auch veröffentlicht in: IIC 23 (1990) 5, 583 - 621
Patentschutz im europäischen Binnenmarkt, GRUR Int 40, 1 (1991), 1 - 13.
Einzelstaatliche Förderung industrieller Forschung und Entwicklung zwischen Binnenmarkt und Technologiegemeinschaft, Europäisches Wirtschafts- und Steuerrecht 2 (1991), 1 - 10.
Nationale Geschäftsgeheimnisse und Gemeinsamer Markt, Recht der internationalen Wirtschaft 36, Beilage 23 zu Heft 12 (1990), 1 - 16.
The Importance of Industrial Property Law and other Legal Measures in the Promotion of Technological Innovation, Industrial property <Genève> 1989, 102 - 112.
Immaterielle Auslandsinvestitionen, gewerbliches Eigentum und internationaler Kapitalanlageschutz, Recht der internationalen Wirtschaft 1987, 69 - 85.
Kartell- und wettbewerbsrechtliche Reaktionen auf verändertes Nachfrageverhalten des Handels in Frankreich, GRUR Int 36, 2 (1987), 69 - 85.
Die Dumpingabwehr der EWG: Vom handelspolitischen Binnenmarktschutz zur internationalen Marktgerechtigkeit, WRP 1 (1986), 5 - 14.
Formzwang und Gestaltungsgrenzen bei Sonderrechten und Nebenleistungspflichten in der GmbH, Zeitschrift für Gesellschafts- und Unternehmensrecht 1985, 235 - 264.
Die wettbewerbspolitische Behandlung gewerblicher Schutzrechte in der EWG, GRUR Int 33, 2 (1984), 89 - 100.
Lohngewähr oder Mängelgewährleistung - Zum Vergütungsanspruch bei fehlerhafter Dienstleistung, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 37, 11 (1984), 585 - 589.
Gesellschafterdarlehen der Banken in der Finanzkrise der GmbH, GmbH-Rundschau 1983, 133 - 146.
Staatliche Förderung industrieller Forschung und Entwicklung - Das Innenverhältnis, Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht 146 (1982), 410 - 444.
Recent Developments of EEC-Antitrust Law, Journal of Japanese Group of the International Association for the Protection of Industrial Property 1977, 11 - 20 (
Die Affaire Carrefour: Warenzeichen am Scheideweg?, GRUR Int 26, 4 (1977), 158 - 159.
Libre circulation des marchandises et droit des marques, Revue trimestrielle de droit européen 11 (1975), 393 - 431.
Warenzeichen und Staatsgrenzen, GRUR Int 24, 8/9 (1975), 291 - 303.
- Auch veröffentlicht in: Rev. trim. dr. eur. 1975, S. 393-431 u.d.T.: Libre circulation des marchandises et droit des marques
Außenhandelssteuerung durch private Selbstbeschränkung, Aussenwirtschaftsdienst des Betriebs-Beraters 20 (1974), 357 - 365.
Deutsche Kartellaufsicht über Exportkartelle, Aussenwirtschaftsdienst des Betriebs-Beraters 20 (1974), 104 - 106.
Patentrechtsschutz ausschließlicher Lizenznehmer gegen Direktlieferungen innerhalb des Gemeinsamen Marktes, GRUR Int 22, 2 (1973), 53 - 61.
Ausschließliche Patentlizenzen im Gemeinsamen Markt, Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handelsrecht und Wirtschaftsrecht 137 (1973), 134 - 169.
Fortschritt im Patentkartellrecht, Rezensionsabhandlung, Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handelsrecht und Wirtschaftsrecht 137 (1973), 70 - 83.
The Impact of the "Sirena" Decision on National Trademark Rights, IIC 3, 2 (1972), 193 - 225.
Der Stand der Assoziierung afrikanischer Staaten mit der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht 135 (1971), 444 - 470.
Der zeitliche Geltungsbereich der Assoziation der assoziierten afrikanischen Staaten und Madagaskars an die Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht 130 (1968), 298 - 350.
Case notes
Anmerkung zu EFTA-Gerichtshof, 03.12.1997 - Rechtssache E2/97 Mag Instrument/California Trading Company (Internationale Erschöpfung des Markenrechts) (International Exhaustion of Trademarks), Mitteilungen der deutschen Patentanwälte 89 (1998), 188 - 191.
- Legal case: Mag Instrument/California Trading Company (Internationale Erschöpfung des Markenrechts) (International Exhaustion of Trademarks), EFTA-Gerichtshof, 1997-12-03
Anmerkung zu Gerichtshof der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, 17.09.1985 - Rechtssachen 25 und 26/1494 - Ford Werke AG/Kommission (Kartellhaftung für einseitige Wettbewerbsbeschränkung) (Antitrust Liability for Unilateral Restraints of Trade), Common Market Law Review 1986, 449 - 465.
- Legal case: - Ford Werke AG/Kommission (Kartellhaftung für einseitige Wettbewerbsbeschränkung) (Antitrust Liability for Unilateral Restraints of Trade), Gerichtshof der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, 1985-09-17
Anmerkung zu Gerichtshof der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, 20.02.1984 - Rechtssachen 228 und 229/82 Ford of Europe/Kommission (Einstweilige Anordnungen im Europäischen Wettbewerbsrecht)(Interim Measures in European Competition Law), Common Market Law Review 1984, 579 - 593.
- Legal case: Ford of Europe/Kommission (Einstweilige Anordnungen im Europäischen Wettbewerbsrecht)(Interim Measures in European Competition Law), Gerichtshof der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, 1984-02-20
Anmerkung zu Court of Appeals, District of Columbia, 11.10.1974 Consumer Union of U. S. v. Henry A. Kissinger (Rechtmäßigkeit von Exportselbstbeschränkungen nach U.S.-Außenwirtschaftsrecht) (Legality of Voluntary Restrictions on Exports Under U.S.-Trade Law, Aussenwirtschaftsdienst des Betriebs-Beraters 1975, 104 - 108.
- Legal case: Consumer Union of U. S. v. Henry A. Kissinger (Rechtmäßigkeit von Exportselbstbeschränkungen nach U.S.-Außenwirtschaftsrecht) (Legality of Voluntary Restrictions on Exports Under U.S.-Trade Law, Court of Appeals, District of Columbia, 1974-10-11
Anmerkung zu Court of Appeals, District of Columbia, 26.07.1973 - Excedrin (Keine privaten Verbraucherklagebefugnisse nach Sec. 5 Federal Trade Commission Act) (No Standing to Sue of Consumers Under Sect. 5 FTC-Act), GRUR Int 23, 6 (1974), 259 - 262.
- Legal case: - Excedrin (Keine privaten Verbraucherklagebefugnisse nach Sec. 5 Federal Trade Commission Act) (No Standing to Sue of Consumers Under Sect. 5 FTC-Act), Court of Appeals, District of Columbia, 1973-07-26
Anmerkung zu Gerichtshof der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, 06.02.1973 Brasserie de Haecht III (Kartellverfahren der EWG-Kommission: Unwirksamkeitsfolgen von Kartellvertragen) (Antitrust Procedure of the EC-Commission; Nullity of Cartel Agreements), Aussenwirtschaftsdienst des Betriebs-Beraters 1973, 329.
- Legal case: Brasserie de Haecht III (Kartellverfahren der EWG-Kommission: Unwirksamkeitsfolgen von Kartellvertragen) (Antitrust Procedure of the EC-Commission; Nullity of Cartel Agreements), Gerichtshof der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, 1973-02-06
Anmerkung zu Bundesgerichtshof, 06.11.1972 - Nahtverlegung (Wettbewerbsbeschränkung im Linzenzvertrag)(Restrictive Covenants in License Contracts), IIC 4, 2 (1973), 255 - 261.
- Legal case: - Nahtverlegung (Wettbewerbsbeschränkung im Linzenzvertrag)(Restrictive Covenants in License Contracts), Bundesgerichtshof, 1972-11-06
Anmerkung zu Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, 22.06.1972 - Meistbegünstigung bei Zollretorsionen nach Art. XXVIII GATT? (Most-Favored-Nation-Treatment and Retaliatory Customs Under Art. XXVIII GATT?), Aussenwirtschaftsdienst des Betriebs-Beraters 1973, 43 - 46.
- Legal case: - Meistbegünstigung bei Zollretorsionen nach Art. XXVIII GATT? (Most-Favored-Nation-Treatment and Retaliatory Customs Under Art. XXVIII GATT?), Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, 1972-06-22
Anmerkung zu Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, 01.07.1971 - In re Talbott, Autorückspiegel (Neuheitsschädlichkeit für U.S.-Patent) (Novelty of U.S.-Patents and Prior Applications for German Design Protection), GRUR Int 21, 7 (1972), 248 - 251.
- Legal case: - In re Talbott, Autorückspiegel (Neuheitsschädlichkeit für U.S.-Patent) (Novelty of U.S.-Patents and Prior Applications for German Design Protection), Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, 1971-07-01
Anmerkung zu Gerichtshof der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, 18.03.1970 - Rechtssache 43/69 Bilger/Jehle - (Unwirksamkeitsfolgen von Kartellverträgen) (Nullity of Cartel Agreements, GRUR Int 19, 12 (1970), 382 - 385.
- Legal case: Bilger/Jehle - (Unwirksamkeitsfolgen von Kartellverträgen) (Nullity of Cartel Agreements, Gerichtshof der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, 1970-03-18
Reviews
Research Papers
The EU Data Act's Rules on Access to and Use of Data and the Rules of the Market (Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper, No. 24-15), 2024, 62
- In order to increase competitiveness and innovation and ensure sustainable economic growth the EU Data Act “on harmonized rules on fair access to and use of data” aims at fostering “the emergence of liquid, fair and efficient markets for non-personal data” of connected products and services (recital 26). More particularly, the objectives of the Act are to enhance the incentives for data holders to enter voluntarily into data sharing agreements and to remove or lower barriers to data sharing. However, due to concerns about both existing asymmetries between the bargaining positions of the market actors and possibly negative effects of exclusive property rights in data, the legislature introduces a mandatory access regime that directly regulates the interactions of the participants of the Internet of Things. This regulatory regime essentially rests on three principles: First, upon attributing the user a non-waivable right to claim access to those data of connected products and services that are readily available for the data holder, and on extending this claim to third parties acting on the user’s behalf. Second, upon the rule that the data holder and/or a third party may use the product or service data only upon consent by the user and within the limits of this consent; third, upon recognizing the legitimacy of the data holder controlling access to and use of the data by virtue of the mere fact of holding the data. The rules implementing these principles provide for a consensus-based use of the readily available data by the parties concerned, on the one hand, and, on the other, for a delimitation of the business spheres of the parties that essentially favors the data holder. More particularly, the user and third parties may not on the basis of the use data compete with the data holder’s product, and rules on technical protection measures, on confidentiality agreements and on tort liability specifically ensure the data holder’s de facto control over the data.
The result is a rather complex regulatory regime that by relying on multilateral consensus on the use of the data rather than on competition for and with the data, creates both high transaction costs and a high potential for conflicts regarding the sharing and use of data and the distribution of their plus value. The regime places the user in a legally central but essentially inadequate position, preserves the data holder’s dominant role regarding the exploitation of the data, and relegates third parties to a position of outsiders. Given these deficits, the Data Act’s access regime will hardly contribute to the emergence of liquid, fair and efficient markets for non-personal data. It is not these deficits alone, however, that will make the Act miss its objectives. Rather, the fundamental reason is that by not in any way defining the legal status of data, but instead accepting de facto control of data by data holders as the rule of the market the legislature failed to enhance the very thing that renders markets liquid and efficient: the reasonably practical and safe tradability of the subject matter of a market transaction.
Die Schattenseite des Einheitspatents (Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Discussion Paper, No. 23 ), 2024, 39
- Mit der Einführung des Europäischen Patentes mit einheitlicher Wirkung (Einheitspatent) ist der Unionsgesetzgeber auf halben Wege zur Schaffung eines „europäischen Rechtstitels über einen einheitlichen Schutz der Rechte des geistigen Eigentums in der Union“ (Art. 118(1) AEUV) stehen geblieben. Die Verordnung 1257/2012 vereinheitlicht nur den Schutz des Patentes als negatives Abwehrrecht, nicht aber seine positive Natur als Vermögensgegenstand. Diese gesetzgeberische Enthaltsamkeit betrifft nicht nur die von der VO 1257/2012 ausgenommene und deshalb auch national unzulässige Erteilung von Zwangslizenzen am unionsrechtlich verfassten Einheitspatent, insbesondere von Zwangslizenzen für die Ausübung abhängiger Patente für technisch und wirtschaftlich bedeutende Erfindungen, sondern auch die nur rudimentär geregelte Lizenzbereitschaftserklärung. Vor allem aber betrifft diese Enthaltsamkeit allgemein die Regelung des Patentes als Vermögensgegenstand, die nur dem Anschein nach einheitlich einem nationalen Recht überlassen ist, tatsächlich aber zu Rechtsungleichheit und Verwertungshindernissen führt, weil Wert und Verwertbarkeit des Einheitspatentes je nach dem anwendbaren nationalen Recht variiert. Diesem gespaltenen Regelungsansatz liegt die Fehlvorstellung des Verordnungsgebers zugrunde, das Patent lasse sich ohne wesentlichen Substanzverlust in ein einheitlich zu regelndes Abwehrrecht und ein nicht einheitlich regelungsbedürftiges Vermögensrecht teilen. Beides bildet jedoch eine Einheit. Die dem Abwehrrecht zugrunde liegende Ausschlusswirkung des Patentes konstituiert zugleich die geschützte Erfindung als Vermögensgegenstand und begründet so den Marktwert des Patentes. Damit der Patentinhaber diesen am Technologie- und Lizenzmarkt durch Veräußerung, Lizenzierung oder Kooperation mit Dritten voll realisieren kann, bedarf es einer eingehenden, transaktionsgerecht einheitlichen Regelung des Patentes als Vermögensgegenstand. Der insoweit bestehende gesetzgeberische Nachholbedarf ist umso dringlicher als in der EU der volle Transaktionswert des Einheitspatents durch den Binnenmarkt als Technologie- und Lizenzmarkt bestimmt wird. Erst wenn dieser Nachholbedarf befriedigt ist, wird das Einheitspatent seine Attraktivität als Investitionsanreiz zur Gänze entfalten und das ihm gegebenenfalls zugrundeliegende Innovationspotential voll ausgeschöpft werden können.
- When introducing the European patent with unitary effect (unitary patent) the EU legislature stopped at midway to creating a European intellectual property right providing protection throughout the Union (Art. 118(1) TFEU). Regulation (EU) 1257/2012 unifies the protection of a European patent only as regards its negative, defensive function, not as regards its transactional function as an object of property, i.e., as a merchandisable asset. First, contrary to first impression, compulsory licenses for the unitary patent, such as mandatory licenses for the exploitation of technically highly advanced and economically important dependent patents, are not covered and, thus, will not be available at all. Second, although covered by Reg. 1257/2012, its Art. 8 deals only cursorily with licenses of right, thus rendering them practically unavailable. Third, even more importantly, the applicability of a single national law, namely that of the patent applicant’s residence or place of business, to the unitary patent as an object of property, while seemingly creating uniform law, ultimately results in legal inequality of unitary patents and in obstacles to their exploitation because their status varies with the applicable national laws and their impact on the patent’s value and exploitability. This split regulatory approach is due to the EU legislature’s ill-conceived idea that as to its defensive function a patent needs fully uniform protection while as to its inclusive function as a property right it needs not to be subject to particular regulation by Union law. However, both functions are but the two faces of the same right. It is the exclusionary effect of the patent that constitutes it as an object of property and determines its market value. Therefore, the value of the unitary patent may only be brought to full bearing on the market for technology and licensing if the law provides for sufficiently detailed uniform rules that fit its transactional function. Filling this regulatory deficit of Reg. 1257/2012 is the more necessary as in the EU the relevant market for determining the unitary patent’s transactional value and, thus its attractiveness as an incentive for investing in innovation is the entire Internal Market.
- Available at SSRN
Patent Dependency Under European and European Union Patent Law – a Regulatory Gap (Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper, No. 23-04), 2023, 57
- Technological progress generally is not disruptive but sequential. Innovations build on prior innovations, typically by presenting improvements or complements. Under patent law, such follow-on innovation meets with an obstacle if the use of the invention underlying it infringes a prior patent, and if, for one reason or another, the owner of that prior patent prefers, as it may, to refuse granting a license. It is only in case the follow-on (or “second”) invention involves an important technical advance of considerable economic significance in relation to the invention claimed in the prior (or “first”) patent that in Europe, in accordance with Art. 31 TRIPS, national patent laws provide for a right of the owner of the second patent to obtain, by way of a decision of the patent office or of a court, a dependency license. By contrast, the EU’s system of unitary patent protection does not provide for a dependency licensing regime. Instead, Reg. 1257/2021 on the European patent with unitary effect refers the matter to national law. This means that despite the importance of its invention the owner of a dependent patent will never obtain a mandatory license covering the Internal Market but only territorially limited national licenses for which it must apply separately in each Member State, go through multiple different procedures and comply with different national requirements. The absurdity of such hindering of follow-on innovation in the Internal Market by regulatory abstention is no less as regards national patents that the European Patent Office grants as a bundle in the form of the European patent and that are now additionally held together by the uniform infringement rules of the Unified Patent Court Agreement. After all, that category of a European patent is supposed to represent an equivalent alternative to the unitary patent and, therefore, ought to meet the same Internal Market requirements. Therefore, this study proposes to harmonize Member States' dependency licensing regimes and to complement the system of unitary patent protection accordingly. To this end, it presents the common principles of national regimes, analyzes the particular need for and characteristics of modern mandatory licensing rules and discusses the deficits of alternative approaches that might be available under EU competition law. A particular stress is put on distinguishing dependency licensing from compulsory licensing in the public interest, and on the functional complementarity existing between incentivizing inventions by patent protection and stimulating follow-on innovation by mandatory licensing regimes.
Harmonization of Employee Invention Laws: The Black Hole of the EU's Innovation Policy (Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper, No. 22-03), 2022, 33
- The European Union has established an almost complete system of protection of intellectual property, in part by harmonizing the laws of its Member States, in part by creating its own titles of unitary protection, in the fields of trade marks, designs and patents even by both harmonization and unification of protection. An area that it has completely neglected, however, is the law of employee inventions although Member States’ national regimes differ considerably, and although it is for 80% to 90% that innovation by patentable inventions rests on the inventive activities of employees in industry and research organizations. This neglect does not only do injustice to the creativity and the rights of employed inventors but affects the proper functioning of the EU’s Internal Market as an innovation market based on dynamic competition and the free movement of workers. This paper is an attempt to rekindle interest in the harmonization of the national laws on employee inventions. It compares the structural differences that exist between the laws of France, Germany and Italy, points out their fundamentally divergent approaches to achieving essentially similar objectives and suggests undertaking a harmonization effort that follows the rationale of all EU harmonization or unification of the law of intellectual property: Modernization of the principles rather than mere approximation of national rules. To this effect, the paper suggests to approach harmonization of national employee invention laws by adopting the very rationale of patent protection – providing for incentives to invest in invention and innovation – also as the guiding principle for the justification and the determination of a remuneration for inventions employees make as a matter or in the context of their employment.
- Available at SSRN
Private Enforcement of the EU Rules on Competition – Nullity Neglected (Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper, No. 21-09), 2021, 36
- Also published in: IIC 52, 5 (2021), 606 - 635
- Private enforcement of the European Union’s rules on competition (Arts. 101, 102 TFEU) has become prominent as a counterpart to their public enforcement. Mostly, it is identified with tort actions brought under EU-harmonized national law by individuals claiming compensation for the harm suffered from anticompetitive agreements or practices. However, claims for compensation represent imperfect sanctions for the infringement of the competition rules because they are brought only once the damage is done and at a time when the conditions of competition may have changed. Typically also, such private actions are no equivalent or complement of administrative enforcement, but largely dependent on it (follow-on actions). In addition, bringing them is attractive only if the damage suffered is considerable, sufficient evidence available, and the defendant solvent enough.
Therefore, this paper revisits the first line of private enforcement, which is enforcing the nullity of anticompetitive agreements as provided for directly by primary Union law in Art. 101(2) TFEU. Nullity was a much discussed issue under the authorization regime of Reg. 17/62, the first regulation implementing the enforcement of the competition rules, but has become somewhat neglected as a sanction since Reg. 1/2003 changed the enforcement system. Yet, it is precisely under the regime of immediate and direct applicability of both Art. 101(1) and 101(3) TFEU, which Reg. 1/2003 reestablished, that the potential of nullity as a sanction of anticompetitive agreements could be fully activated. Such active use of invalidity challenges may lead to redefining the interface between EU law and national contract law, which is the line of severability of the innocent parts of a restrictive agreement from its anti-competitive parts. It should also result in reassessing the legal fate of follow-on transactions concluded by a party to an anticompetitive agreement with third parties, and it should bring abusive contracts within the realm of the nullity sanction that dominant firms impose on third parties. The guiding principle for such general reappraisal of the nullity sanction must be to bring its purpose fully to bear, which is to facilitate exit from anticompetitive agreements or from (abusive) contract clauses with a view to reopening competition and/or to allow the renegotiating of a transaction in terms of undistorted competition. This may mean that only the party whose freedom of competition is restricted may claim nullity. - Available at SSRN
Patentqualität: Ein rechtliches Systemdilemma? (Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Discussion Paper, No. 15), 2020, 19
- Die Sorge um eine befriedigende Qualität erteilter Patente wird in der Fachwelt immer wieder kontrovers diskutiert. Bei dieser Sorge geht es sowohl um die Verlässlichkeit des gewährten Rechtsschutzes, die durch angeblich oder tatsächlich zu hohe Nichtigkeitsquoten gefährdet erscheint, als auch um die sachlich angemessene Auslegung und Anwendung der Patenterteilungsvoraussetzungen, insbesondere der erfinderischen Tätigkeit (Naheliegen). Ohne näher auf die verwandten Fragen der ständig wachsenden Patentquantität eingehen zu können, soll die Studie den Zugang zur Gesamtproblematik der Patentqualität durch eine Neugliederung und Präzisierung der Streitpunkte erleichtern. So werden ausgehend von den kontroversen empirischen Befunden zu Patentnichtigkeitsquoten deren Gründe einerseits in der organisatorisch-verfahrensrechtlichen Praxis der Patentämter, insbesondere des Europäischen Patentamtes, und andererseits in der Natur und Handhabung der sachlichen Patentierungskriterien erörtert. Diese Erörterung führt dazu, Patentqualität nicht nur als Problem der Patenterteilung, sondern als ein solches der Qualität des Patentsystems insgesamt zu verstehen, dessen Orientierung an technologischen Maßstäben seiner ökonomischen Funktion als System zur Förderung von Innovationen im Markt nicht angemessen ist. Da es jedoch keine vernünftige Alternative zum Konzept des Erfindungs-schutzes durch Patente gibt, bleibt nur der Weg der kontinuierlichen Suche nach seiner besseren Ausgestaltung durch schrittweise Veränderung.
- Time and again, the concern about a satisfactory quality of granted patents has resulted in controversial discussions within the patent community. The concern is both about the reliability of the protection afforded, which seems to be put in jeopardy by actually or allegedly too high invalidation rates, and about the appropriate interpretation and application of the substantive granting conditions, in particular the requirement of an inventive step (non-obviousness). Leaving aside the related matter of an ever increasing patent quantity, the paper aims at facilitating access to the overall problem of patent quality by specifying and restructuring the issues. Thus, it takes the controversial empirical findings of invalidation rates as a starting point for discussing their likely causes in organizational/procedural practice of patent offices, in particular the European Patent Office, and in the very nature and apprehension of the criteria of patentability. This discussion leads to understanding patent quality as a problem not only of the grant of particular patents, but also as one of the quality of the patent system as such, whose orientation along technological criteria may not adequately fit its economic function as a system of promoting innovation in the market place. However, since there is no reasonable alternative to the concept of protecting inventions by patents, the only way forward is the continuous quest for its improved implementation by incremental modifications.
- Available at SSRN
FRAND Access to Open Standards and the Patent Exclusivity: Restating the Principles (Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper, No. 17-04), 2017, 48
- When technical standards are to be defined pursuant to the claims of a patent and, therefore, the use of the standard will necessarily infringe that standard-essential patent (SEP), the proprietor may commit to granting all users a license at fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) conditions as a way to promote acceptance of the standard by the market. However, the relationship between such FRAND licensing commitment and a patentee’s right to seek and obtain injunctive relief from patent infringement by standard implementers not (yet) having entered into a license agreement remains controversial. In Huawei Technologies v. ZTE, the Court of Justice of the EU has shown a way to overcome the tension between the protection of patents by prohibitory orders and open access to innovative standards that has its origin in general principles of commercial law rather than in competition law. In view of this new approach, the paper restates the legal principles that, as a matter of public policy, govern the interaction of patent protection and open standardization in the EU. These principles are the free choice of patent protection and of a standard setting organization pursuing a particular IPR policy, and the self-regulatory organization of open, innovative standard setting on the one hand, and, on the other, the complementary functioning of patent protection and institutionalized open standard setting as a way to promote innovation and its dissemination. That principled framework regulation of dynamic markets also calls for holding all market actors concerned responsible for exercising their freedom in conformity with rules of fairness so that, ultimately, the complementary public policies underlying patent protection and innovative standardization, respectively, will be satisfied. While competition law reinforces the rules for such responsible conduct, they rest on and need to be implemented by reference to the legal framework of open innovative standardization itself. By way of conclusion, the EU’s negotiation approach to determining the meaning of FRAND in a particular case is put in contrast to quasi-regulatory approaches that by assimilating a standard to an essential facility subject SEPs to a mandatory licensing rule and, therefore, also to determination of FRAND terms by administrative or judicial decision.
- SSRN
Anti-Unfair Competition Law and Anti-Trust Law: A Continental Conundrum? (EUI Working Paper LAW, No. 2005/01), 2005, 46
Report on "Role and Strategic Use of IPR (Intellectual Property Rights) in International Research Collaborations" as member of the ETAN expert group (European Technology Assessment Network), European Commission Directorate-General for Research Information and Communication Unit, Brussels 2001, 50 + X
Report on "Strategic Dimensions of Intellectual Property Rights in the context of Science and Technology Policy" as member of the ETAN expert group (European Technology Assessment Network), ETAN Working Paper 1999, XVIII + 51
Report to the Ministry of Research and Technology on the Operation of Grant Conditions Relating to Computer Software and to Cooperation of Science with Industry, 1993.
Report to the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation: Evaluating the Establishment of a Patent System in the People’s Republic of China, 1987.
Opinions
Stellungnahme zum Diskussionsentwurf eines Zweiten Gesetzes zur Vereinfachung und Modernisierung des Patentrechts, 2020, 16
- Das Max-Planck-Institut für Innovation und Wettbewerb nimmt hiermit zum Diskussionsentwurf eines Zweiten Gesetzes zur Vereinfachung und Modernisierung des Patentrechts Stellung, der vom Bundesministerium der Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz im Januar 2020 vorgelegt wurde. Das Institut begrüßt die Initiative des Ministeriums, empfiehlt im Hinblick auf die Beschränkung des patentrechtlichen Unterlassungsanspruchs und die Stärkung des Schutzes von Geschäftsgeheimnissen in Patentstreitsachen jedoch gewisse Präzisierungen.
Mit Blick auf die Beschränkung des Unterlassungsanspruchs nach Maßgabe des Grundsatzes der Verhältnismäßigkeit wird vorgeschlagen, die Verhältnismäßigkeitsprüfung nicht auf einen Anwendungsfall der Gebote von Treu und Glauben zu reduzieren, sondern im Sinne der ratio legis des Patentrechts zu verstehen; insoweit als Maßnahme zur Verhinderung dysfunktionaler Effekte des Ausschließlichkeitsrecht bzw. des damit verbundenen Unterlassungsanspruchs. Zur Veranschaulichung des Ansatzes wird auf die Fallgruppen der komplexen Produkte, der Patentverwerter und der standardessenziellen Patente Bezug genommen, ohne sie jedoch im Detail durchzuprüfen. Mit Blick auf die im Rahmen der Verhältnismäßigkeitsprüfung vorzunehmende Interessenabwägung wird darauf hingewiesen, dass die Interessen des Patentinhabers gegenüber jenen des Verletzers keinen grundsätzlichen Vorrang genießen. Darüber hinaus sind bei der Abwägung nicht nur die Interessen der Streitparteien, sondern auch jene Dritter, insbesondere das öffentliche Interesse, zu berücksichtigen.
Mit Blick auf den Schutz von Geschäftsgeheimnissen in Patentstreitsachen verweist die Stellungnahme auf Unzulänglichkeiten des Verfahrens in Geschäftsgeheimnisstreitsachen, die durch die angedachte Anwendung der entsprechenden Vorschriften auf das Patentstreitverfahren übertragen werden. Hingewiesen wird auch auf eine mögliche Regelungslücke in Bezug auf das "Düsseldorfer Verfahren", die von Patentinhabern für sog. "fishing expeditions" ausgenutzt werden könnte. - This position paper of the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition provides comments on the amendments proposed by the German Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection in its discussion draft of January 2020 on the modernization and simplification of the German Patent Act. While the Institute generally welcomes the initiative, the paper offers some suggestions aimed at increasing precision in the areas of first, the concept and the implementation of the proportionality test for granting injunctive relief, and, second, the need for enhanced protection of trade secrets in patent disputes.
With regard to the proportionality assessment, the Institute suggests that, rather than reducing it to an application of the principle of good faith, the concept of proportionality should be interpreted and applied in light of the ratio legis of patent protection with a view to preventing dysfunctional effects potentially resulting from the exercise of the exclusive right and the associated claim to an injunction. Scenarios involving complex products, non-practicing entities and standard-essential patents are used to illustrate the approach. As regards the weighing and balancing of interests when assessing proportionality, the position paper argues that it is neither desirable nor appropriate to prioritize the interests of the patentee over those of the infringer as a matter of principle. In addition, it is not only the interests of parties to the dispute, but also those of third parties, in particular the public interest, that should be taken into account.
With regard to the protection of trade secrets in patent disputes, the position paper refers to certain procedural insufficiencies of the Trade Secrets Act to adequately protect the defendant’s secrecy interests. It also points out a potential loophole in relation to the "Düsseldorf proceedings" that may facilitate "fishing expeditions". - Stellungnahme_2020-03-1final.pdf
- Also published at SSRN as Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Discussion Paper No. 16
- English version published under the title: Position Paper on the Envisaged Reform of the German Patent Act as Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No. 20-05
Comments of the Max-Planck-Institute for Intellectual Property and Competition Law on the Preliminary Set of Provisions for the Rules of Procedure of the Unified Patent Court, 2013, 10
- This text is a re-formatted version of comments submitted by the Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property and Competition Law in the public consultation on the 15th draft for Rules of Procedure for the Unified Patent Court conducted between June and October 2013. The comments focus on those Rules and do, in particular, not duplicate criticism for the Unitary Patent Package voiced elsewhere. Three fundamental aspects of particular importance for the functionality of the procedural regime are identified: Warranting uniformity, safeguarding autonomy and establishing an adequate balance of rights and obligations between the parties.
The comments underline that, within the strict bounds imposed by the Unitary Patent Package, the Rules offer a well elaborated and substantially comprehensive framework for patent litigation procedures. Nonetheless, certain parts fall short of answering to the requirements imposed by the complexities of the system in which they are embedded. In particular, the Rules should not shy away from suggesting solutions in politically delicate areas if essential for the overall balance and functioning of the system. This concerns, for example, the exercise of discretion regarding the choice of options pursuant to Art. 33(3) UPC or the balancing of interests in the context of granting injunctive relief. - Also published as: Max-Planck-Institute for Intellectual Property and Competition Law Research Paper Series No. 13-16
The Unitary Patent Package: Twelve Reasons for Concern, 2012, 5
Also published as : Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property & Competition Law Research Paper No. 12-12- Auch veröffentlicht in: CIPA Journal, 2012, H. 10, 553 - 555
- A balanced, innovation-friendly and uniform patent system is indispensable for Europe. However, the latest EU proposal for a patent package (Patent Regulation and flanking court system) is both dangerous and misguided. While a superficial glance may create the false impression of a patent law advancement through the proposal, it instead actually threatens to forestall the necessary legal progress and innovation capacities for the foreseeable future. It might prove disastrous to implement a patent system which is already known to be detrimental from both the legal as well as the innovation perspectives. This paper provides a short introduction to the major reasons for concern regarding the current proposals and explains why it is imperative to reconsider the proposals entirely afresh.
- MPI-IP_Twelve-Reasons_2012-10-17.pdf
- SSRN-Paper
- Institutswebsite
Comments of the Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law on the Draft Commission Block Exemption Regulation on Research and Development Agreements and the Draft Guidelines on Horizontal Cooperation Agreements, 2010, 28
- Auch veröffentlicht in IIC, 41,8 (2010), 948 - 965
- Comments-RegualtionResearchDevelopmentAgreements6.pdf
Further Publications, Press Articles, Interviews
Modernizing German Patent Law: Toward an Explicit Obligation for Proportionality Control of Injunctions?, Oxford Business Law Blog 2020 12.06.2020 (
Lectures
03/26/19
Privatrechte als Integrationsanreize - Potential und Defizite in der EU
Europarechtliche Werkstattgespräche
Organized by: University of Vienna
Location: Vienna, Austria
10/2017
Protecting Patents Beyond Their Limits
Guest lecture
Location: ETH Zürich, Center for Law & Economics, Zurich, Switzerland
10/2017
The European Union’s Patent System After the Brexit: Unitary Protection Everywhere?
Guest lecture
Location: ETH Zürich, Center for Law & Economics, Zurich, Switzerland
05/2017
Fake News Flooding the Internet: Remedies Without Censorship
Fake News Flooding the Internet – Behavioural Remedies in the Public Interest
XXXII Conference of the “Giordano Dell'Amore” Observatory on the relationship between law and economics
Location: Fondazione Centro Nazionale di Prevenzioni e Difesa Sociale, Milan, Italy
04/2017
Le système de protection du brevet unitaire de l’Union après le Brexit: désuni, mais unifié?
Brexit et Propriété intellectuelle: Perspectives et réalités
Location: Institut de recherche en propriété intellectuelle, Université de Paris II, Paris, France
09.12.16
Intellectual Property (Patents), Competition Law and Standards under EU Law
EU – China Innovation Policies Roundtable
Location: Xiamen University, Xiamen, China
02.12.16
EuGH und EPG im europäischen Patentschutzsystem: Wer hat was zu sagen?
Symposium on methodological questions of patent law
Location: Humboldt Universität Berlin, Berlin, Germany
09.06.16
Intellectual Property Protection in the EU: A Law for its Own Community Only?
Workshop: The EUI Law Department and the next 40 years of legal research
Location: European University Institute, Florence, Italy
15.04.16
The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) – Issues and Perspectives for International Commercial Law
Academic Workshop, General Introduction
Location: College of Europe, Law Department, and Association internationale de droit économique, Bruges, Belgium
11.06.15
The Prospect of a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership and Intellectual Property: Globalizing Bilateral Deep Integration?
Location: IP Center Turku University, Helsinki, Finland
Courses
01 — 06/19
Seminar: Protecting Innovation and Creation by Intellectual Property: The EU Framework
Post-graduate Master Studiengang European Law
Visiting Professor
Location: College of Europe, Brügge, Belgium
03/04/ — 03/08/19
Applying EU competition rules to IP-related contracts
WIPO-Tongji Master's Degree Program in Intellectual Property
Location: Tongji Universit Shanghai, PR China
2015/2016
Seminar: The Legal and Political Foundations of Intellectual Property Protection in the EU (Patents, Trademarks, Copyright)
Visiting Professor
Location: College of Europe, Brügge, Belgium