Events

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competiton, room E 10

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, Munich, Room 313

Researchers’ scientific excellence determines much of the academic reward system including publication output, career promotion and research funding. In this article, we compare different measures of scientific excellence, adding to the discussion on measuring scientific quality and research performance. We construct several author-author text similarity indicators between a stratified sample of scientists and ‘frontier scientists’, which we identify through academic prizes and prestigious third-party funding (ERC grants). We address the question whether high (low) scientists’ similarity (or distance) to the frontier of knowledge provides a valid measure of scientific excellence in comparison to citation counts.

Contact Person: Dr. Fabian Gaessler

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, Munich, Room 313

Are the social norms of basic science and the formal rules of the patent system complementary, or conflicting regulations for innovation? In view of the advancing implementation of innovation as the third mission of public basic science, my study investigates scientists’ motivations to patent, as well as their perception of patent-related research impediments. It does so by means of semi-structured interviews among scientists in German public basic research institutes. The reported motives correspond to strategic motives found in industry, but relate to science-specific incentives. Furthermore, the results indicate that while social norms in science compensate potential research impediments created by existing patents, secrecy caused by the intention to patent can create friction with academic norms for cooperation and knowledge sharing. These results are interpreted to indicate that patent functions and effects are not defined by the patent system itself, but at the multiple levels of governance of the socioeconomic system which utilizes patents.

Contact Person: Dr. Fabian Gaessler

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, Munich, Room 313

Staged financing of start-ups can be achieved with different investor constellations. One is that companies obtain funding from different investors at different stages. Another is that a deep pocketed investor continues investing in the company across multiple stages, usually as part of a syndicate. The valuation of start-ups is influenced by investor constellations, in particular strategic interactions between outside investors and deep-pocketed insiders. Our theory models the investment choices and valuations of start-ups, deriving advantages and disadvantages of deep pocketed investors. The analysis explains the significance of pro-rata investments, and the role of pre-emptive rights.

Contact person: Felix Pöge

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, Munich, Room 313

To study how governments can improve the quality of patent screening, we develop an integrative framework incorporating four main policy instruments: patent office examination, pre- and post-grant fees, and challenges in the courts. We show that examination and pre-grant fees are complementary, and that pre-grant fees screen more e ectively than post-grant fees. Simulations of the model, calibrated on U.S. patent and litigation data, indicate that patenting is socially excessive and the patent oce does not e ectively weed out low-quality applications. We quantify the welfare effects of counterfactual policy reforms and show how they depend on the quality of the courts (co-authored with Mark Schankerman).

Contact Person: Dr. Fabian Gaessler

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, Munich, Room E10

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, Munich, Room E10

Professor Richard S. Markovits ist Lehrstuhlinhaber an der University of Texas at Austin. Seine Arbeitsgebiete umfassen das Kartellrecht, Law and Economics sowie das Verfassungsrecht. Das Antitrust Bulletin hat mit dem Heft 2016, issue 1, ein gesamtes Symposiums-Heft dem kartellrechtlichen Wirken von Richard Markovits und seinem Einfluss auf das US-amerikanische Kartellrecht gewidmet. Professor Markovits hat in renommierten Journals publiziert und insbesondere im Jahr 2014 im Springer-Verlag das zweibändige Werk „Economics and the Interpretation and Application of U.S. and E.U. Antitrust Law“.

In seinem Vortrag wird Richard Markovits verschiedene, rechtspraktisch bedeutsame Ansätze zur Beurteilung von kartellrechtlichen Strategien im US-amerikanischen und europäischen Kartellrecht erklären. Zudem wird er das insbesondere in der Fusionskontrolle zentrale Konzept der kartellrechtlichen Marktabgrenzung analysieren und dessen Eignung zur Identifikation von kartellrechtswidrigem Verhalten hinterfragen. Dabei wird er darlegen, dass in der Praxis der US-amerikanischen Kartellbehörden sowie der Europäischen Kommission formal zwar marktbezogene Ansätze verfolgt werden, inhaltlich zu diesen Konzepten jedoch eine Distanz besteht. Anschließend erörtert Professor Markovits die Notwendigkeit, neben Preiswettbewerb auch stärker den Qualitätswettbewerb zu berücksichtigen. Schließlich wird Professor Markovits die „General Theory of Second Best“ vorstellen sowie Schlussfolgerungen für die Berücksichtigungsfähigkeit von Effizienzen im Kartellrecht und der Wettbewerbspolitik ziehen.

Wir bitten um Anmeldung bis zum Dienstag, 4. Juli 2017, bei Frau Delia Zirilli.

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, Munich, Room 313

US government spending since World War II has been characterized by large investments in defense-related high-tech goods and services and R&D. In turn, this means that the De- partment of Defense (DoD) has had a large role in funding corporate innovation in the US. This paper (i) quantifies the impact of military procurement spending on corporate innovation by publicly listed firms and (ii) shows that DoD impact on innovation was not limited to the winners of defense contracts but instead cascaded through the supply chain of DoD contractors via indirect market size effects, working through firm-to-firm input linkages. We use a database of detailed, historical procurement contracts for all Department of Defense (DoD) prime contracts since 1966. Product-level spending shifts are used as a source of exogenous variation in firm-level procurement receipts. We combine this data with information on the supply chain linkages of publicly listed firms. Our estimates indicate that defense procurement has a positive direct impact on patenting and R&D in- vestment, with an elasticity of approximately 0.07 across both measures of innovation for DoD contractors. Further, our estimates imply that the derived demand for inputs fol- lowing the award of a DoD contract constitutes a large indirect market size effect for the suppliers of DoD contractors. These indirect market size effects in turn induce innovation cascades working up the supply chain. We find that the elasticity of innovation outcomes to indirect DoD market size shocks is about half of that estimated for direct contractors but affects a much larger number of firms, increasing the effect of defense spending on aggregate innovation by at least 20%. (joint work with Vasco M. Carvalho)

Contact Person: Laura Rosendahl Huber

Max-Planck-Gesellschaft, Generalverwaltung, Konferenzraum, Hofgartenstr. 8, München

Zu praktischen Folgen von BGH Fräsverfahren - in welchen Fallkonstellationen sind ggf. sehr zeit- und ressourcenaufwändige Beweiserhebungen zur Aktivlegitimation im Patentverletzungsprozess sachgerecht und in welchen nicht? Theorie und Praxis scheinen derzeit womöglich etwas auseinander zu fallen. In jedem Fall besteht Anlass zur Diskussion.

Prof. Dr. Tilman Müller-Stoy ist Partner bei BARDEHLE PAGENBERG und einer der beiden Leiter der Patent Litigation Group der Kanzlei. Er lehrt Patentrecht an der TU München und der University of Washington School of Law. Er ist ferner Chair des Dispute Resolution Commitee von LESI und ausgebildeter Wirtschaftsmediator (MuCDR).

Seine anwaltliche Praxis ist fokussiert auf Patentstreitsachen in allen technischen Gebieten nebst Lizenzrecht und Technologietransfer. Tilman Müller-Stoy hat besondere Erfahrung in der Koordination länderübergreifender Prozessserien sowie bei der Erstellung, Bewertung, Durchsetzung von und Verteidigung gegen Lizenzprogramme(n) in den Bereichen der Telekommunikation und Elektrotechnik, vor allem auch mit Bezug zu SEPs und FRAND Lizenzen. Er wird seit Jahren in allen wesentlichen Rankings als einer der führenden Rechtsanwälte für Patentstreitsachen in Deutschland empfohlen.